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ABSTRACT 
 
The Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 will introduce a new framework––the 
Liberty Protection Safeguards (LPS)––for authorising arrangements giving rise to a 
deprivation of liberty to enable the care and treatment of people who lack capacity to 
consent to them in England and Wales. The LPS will replace the heavily criticised Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 deprivation of liberty safeguards (MCA DoLS).  The new scheme 
must provide detention safeguards on an unprecedented scale and across a much more 
diverse range of settings than traditional detention frameworks linked to mental 
disability. Accordingly, the LPS are highly flexible, and grant detaining authorities 
considerable discretion in how they perform this safeguarding function. This review 
outlines the background to the 2019 amendments to the MCA, and contrasts the LPS 
with the DoLS. It argues that although the DoLS were in need of reform, the new 
scheme also fails to deliver adequate detention safeguards, and fails to engage with 
the pivotal question: what are these safeguards for? 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 was supposed to be a ‘really small, 
uncontroversial’ Bill,1 one the whips could safely steer through a febrile parliamentary 
session engulfed by Brexit-related chaos.  Its object and purpose was to replace the 
current administrative framework for authorising deprivation of liberty in care homes 
and hospitals – the Mental Capacity Act 2005 deprivation of liberty safeguards (DoLS) 
– which were universally agreed to be broken and in need of reform. As it happened, 
the whips were wrong; the Bill was widely criticised and the government was defeated 
three times in the Lords.  However, the Bill received Royal Assent in May 2019 and is 
planned to commence in October 2020.2   
     
* Wellcome Senior Research Fellow and Lecturer in Law, School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University, 
UK.   Contact email: SeriesL@cardiff.ac.uk.  
1 Hansard, HL Series 5, Vol. 797 col. 622, (24 April 2019) – The Baroness Thornton.  
2 Department of Health & Social Care, ‘Will-write letter’ from Minister of State for Care (10 June 2019) 
at data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2019-
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The 2019 amendments to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) replaced the DoLS with  
a successor scheme: the Liberty Protection Safeguards (LPS).3 The LPS are intended to 
deliver safeguards compliant with article 5 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR),4 the right to liberty and security of the person, for people who are 
deprived of their liberty in connection with arrangements to enable their care and 
treatment.  
 
It is envisaged that the LPS will authorise an estimated 304,132 detentions annually in 
England and Wales.5 To put this into perspective: in 2018-19 there were just under 
50,000 new detentions to provide inpatient treatment for mental disorder under the 
MCA’s sister statute (the Mental Health Act 1983 MHA),6 the prison population in 
England and Wales stood at just over 82,000,7 and over 26,000 people passed through 
immigration detention.8  The new LPS will represent a high-water mark in the history 
of detention in the UK (Figure 1, below).  
 
These are not ‘paradigmatic’ cases of deprivation of liberty.9  The affected population 
is predominantly older adults with dementia and people with intellectual disabilities, 
autism or brain injuries.10 A minority, less than 2%, will be receiving inpatient treatment 
for mental disorder in psychiatric hospitals. 11  Some will be treated for physical 
conditions in general or acute hospitals. The largest affected group will be in residential 
     
0635/letter_from_Caroline_Dinenage_Liberty_Protection_Safeguards.pdf (unless otherwise stated, all 
URLs were last accessed on 19 July 2019). 
3 The DoLS are contained in MCA schedules A1 and 1A. The LPS are contained in the new MCA schedule 
AA1. 
4 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Council of Europe) 213 
UNTS 222, ETS No 5, UN Reg No I-2889; [Opened for Signature] 4th Nov 1950, [Entered into Force] 3rd 
Sep 1953]. 
5  Department of Health and Social Care, ‘Impact Assessment: Mental Capacity 
(Amendment) Bill (Revised IA, dated 31/01/2019): at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-
2019/0323/MCAB%20Impact%20Assessment%20FINAL.rtf%20SIGNED.pdf 
6 NHS Digital, ‘Mental Health Act Statistics’ Annual Figures 2018-19: at https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-
information/publications/statistical/mental-health-act-statistics-annual-figures/2018-19-annual-figures 
7 Ministry of Justice, HM Prison Service and Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service, 
‘Official Statistics, Prison population figures 2018’ (2019): at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/prison-population-figures-2018 
8  Home Office, ‘Immigration statistics, year ending March 2018’ : at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-statistics-year-ending-march-2018 
9 S.W. Stark, ‘Deprivations of liberty: beyond the paradigm’ (2019) (April) Public law  
[380-401].  
10NHS Digital, ‘Supplementary information: DoLS activity by disability group during reporting period 2017-
18’ (2019): at https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/find-data-and-publications/supplementary-
information/2019-supplementary-information-files/dols-activity-by-disability-group-during-reporting-
period-2017-18. 
11 In 2017-18, 5,260 DoLS applications in England were from ‘mental health establishments’ out of a 
total of 240,455 (2%).  However, the LPS will apply to a larger population because it incorporates new 
settings and age groups. NHS Digital, ‘Mental Capacity Act 2005, Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards 
England, 2018-19’ (2019) at: https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/mental-
capacity-act-2005-deprivation-of-liberty-safeguards-assessments/england-2018-19. Equivalent data are 
not given for Wales: Care Inspectorate Wales and Healthcare Inspectorate Wales, ‘Deprivation of Liberty 
Safeguards Annual Monitoring Report for Health and Social Care 2017-18’ (2019), at: 
https://careinspectorate.wales/deprivation-liberty-safeguards-annual-monitoring-report-health-and-
social-care-2017-18. 
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care or nursing homes.12 More perplexingly, the LPS will also apply to tens of thousands 
of adults living in private homes, including ‘supported living’ accommodation and, in 
what is likely to be a source of growing social and political anxiety, some adults living 
with their families.13 
 
Internationally, there is growing concern about the ‘re-institutionalisation’ of disabled 
adults in community settings,14 with some states and international bodies beginning to 
view this through the lens of detention. 15  The LPS will be of interest to states 
contemplating regulatory responses to non-paradigmatic detentions. Whether they will 
improve upon the DoLS––which were regarded internationally as a cautionary tale16–– 
remains to be seen. 
 
The application of the detention paradigm to settings that have until very recently 
represented freedom in the community raises searching questions about how, and why, 
we have come to invoke this right in these contexts. These pressing questions are 
beyond the scope of this review; which considers the operational challenges of securing 
article 5 compliant safeguards on this scale. I outline the background to the DoLS and 
the LPS, before examining their provisions in greater detail and charting the key issues 
and debates that arose during the law reform process.   
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
     
12 Ibid. 
13 Response to request for information from the Law Commission under the Freedom of Information Act 
2000, 10 May 2019, available upon request from author. 
14 N. Crowther, ‘The right to live independently and to be included in the community in European States: 
ANED synthesis report’ (European Network of Academic Experts in the Field of Disability (ANED), 2019)  
at: https://www.disability-europe.net/theme/independent-living. 
15 W. Boente, ‘Some Continental European Perspectives on Safeguards in the Case of 
Deprivation of Liberty in Health and Social Care Settings’ (2017) (23) International 
Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law [69-83]; Fritze, Chesterman, Grano, 
‘Designing a deprivation of liberty authorisation and regulation framework: Discussion 
paper’ (Office of the Public Advocate, Victoria 2017);  Victorian Law Reform Commission, 
‘Guardianship final report background paper: Legislative schemes regulating 
deprivation of liberty in residential care settings’ (2012); Royal Commission into Aged 
Care Quality and Safety, ‘Restrictive Practices in Residential Aged Care in Australia’ 
(Background Paper 4, 2019) at: https://agedcare.royalcommission.gov.au/; UNHRC 
‘Report by Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities C Devandas 
Aguilar’ UN Doc A/HRC/40/54, (11 January 2019) ; See also recent complaints brought 
to the CRPD Committee - DR v Australia (communication 14/2003) 
CRPD/C/17/D/14/2013), (19 May 2017); and also jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights, e.g. Stanev v Bulgaria (2012) 55 E.H.R.R. 22; [2012] M.H.L.R. 23. 
DD v Lithuania [2012] M.H.L.R. 209. 
16 (Ibid) Victorian Law Reform Commission ; (Ibid) Victoria Office of the Public Advocate, 
Fritze, Chesterman and Grano ;  Scottish Law Commission, Report on Adults with 
Incapacity (Scot Law Com No 240, 2014); McKay, Stavert, ‘Scotland's Mental Health 
and Capacity Law: The Case for Reform’ Edinburgh Napier University (2017) at: 
http://www.napier.ac.uk/about-us/news/mentalwelfarecommission; Department of 
Health (Ireland - An Roinn Sláinte), ‘Deprivation of Liberty: Safeguard Proposals: 
Consultation Paper’ (2017) at: https://health.gov.ie/consultations/ 
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The MCA 2005 is an unlikely vehicle for the detention of over 300,000 people.  Unlike 
the MHA it is not generally viewed as a ‘compulsory power’,17 and is often described 
domestically as ‘empowering’.18 It provides a framework for making substitute decisions 
in the ‘best interests’ of a person considered to lack the ‘mental capacity’ to make a 
particular decision. Whereas the MHA includes a ‘public protection’ remit, the focus of 
the MCA is on the protection of the individual.  
 
The MCA potentially applies to almost all decisions in a person’s life; from what they 
eat for breakfast, to where they live, their relationships with others, and decisions about 
medical treatments.  It is central to almost all aspects of the care and treatment of 
populations whose capacity may be in doubt. 
 
A key characteristic of the MCA is its ‘informality’. Even very serious medical and 
personal welfare decisions can potentially be made without the involvement of courts 
or formally appointed decision makers.  Instead, caregivers can rely upon a ‘general 
defence’ against liability19, which codified the common law position that acts of care or 
treatment in the best interests of those lacking the capacity to consent can rely upon 
the doctrine of necessity.20 This was viewed by the Law Commission in the 1990s as 
avoiding the stigma and ‘bureaucracy’ associated with mental health law, ‘normalising’ 
the care and treatment of people deemed to lack capacity.21 However, the defence has 
been described as operating in practice as a broad de facto power22 whilst providing 
few of the procedural safeguards commonly associated with compulsory powers.  
 
The MCA contains a scheme of Independent Mental Capacity Advocacy (IMCAs)23 and 
potential recourse to the Court of Protection, a superior court of record, in cases of 
doubt or dispute.24  However, legal challenges to decisions made under the MCA are 
rare.25 
 
(a) THE BOURNEWOOD CASE 
 
The government did not initially associate the MCA with detention when developing the 
Bill.26 This changed in October 2004, at the Bill’s second reading, when the European 
     
17  E.g. Wessely et al, ‘Modernising the Mental Health Act’ (Final report of the 
Independent Review of the Mental Health Act 1983) December 2018 [123]. 
18 E.g. Department for Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice (2007) 
[foreword by The Rt Hon. the Lord Falconer of Thoroton]. 
 
19 MCA ss 5, 6. 
20 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 A.C. 1; [1989] 2 W.L.R. 1025. 
21 Law Commission, Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: An Overview (Law Com No 119, 
1991). 
22 A. Ruck Keene, ‘Powers, defences and the ‘need’ for judicial sanction’ (2016) (Autumn) Elder Law 
Journal [244-52]. 
23 MCA s35-41. 
24 MCA ss 15, 16.  
25 L. Series, P. Fennell and J. Doughty, ‘Welfare cases in the Court of Protection: A statistical overview’ 
Cardiff University, Report for the Nuffield Foundation (2017), at: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/118054. 
26 Lord Chancellor's Office, Who decides? Making decisions on behalf of mentally incapacitated adults, 
Cm 2803 (1997); Lord Chancellor's Office, "Making Decisions" The Government's proposals for making 
decisions on behalf of mentally incapacitated adults, Cm 4465 (1999); Department for Constitutional 
Affairs, Draft Mental Incapacity Bill, Cm 5859 (2003). 
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Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled in HL v UK 27 that an autistic man who was 
‘informally’ admitted to Bournewood Hospital, apparently in his best interests and on 
grounds of necessity, had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty.  
 
HL had been living in the community with his carers but had been taken to Bournewood 
Hospital following agitated behaviour at his day centre. For historical reasons, the MHA 
is primarily used to formally detain patients who are regarded as ‘objecting’ to 
admission or treatment; it is rarely used for those who are regarded as compliant with 
admission and treatment.28  HL was sedated, and although his behaviour indicated that 
he was very distressed29 he was not regarded by clinicians as ‘objecting’ or attempting 
to leave.  Without the provisions of the MHA, there was no obvious mechanism for his 
carers or relatives to seek to discharge him or challenge his informal admission.  A 
claim was brought on HL’s behalf seeking judicial review of the decision to ‘detain’ HL 
and a writ of habeas corpus to secure his discharge. The domestic courts approached 
the question of whether HL had been detained through the lens of the tort of false 
imprisonment, with the House of Lords concluding that he was not falsely imprisoned 
because he had not actually attempted to leave. Even if he had been so detained, they 
held that the hospital had a defence against liability under the common law doctrine of 
necessity.30 
 
HL’s family and carers successfully pursued the case to the ECtHR, which rejected the 
distinction relied upon by the House of Lords between ‘actual restraint’ and ‘restraint 
which was conditional upon his seeking to leave’. 31  HL ‘was under continuous 
supervision and control and was not free to leave’, and was thus deprived of his 
liberty.32  Noting the dearth of regulation and safeguards for informal admissions, the 
Strasbourg Courtfound a violation of the article 5(1) ECHR requirement for a ‘procedure 
required by law’ and no effective means to challenge the detention before an 
appropriately constituted authority (namely a court/tribunal etc) as is required by article 
5(4). HL’s detention, and that of thousands like him, was therefore unlawful under the 
Convention. 
 
(b) THE DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY SAFEGUARDS 
 
The government consulted on what to do about the estimated 100,000 adults in care 
homes and hospitals who fell within the so called ‘Bournewood gap’ following the ruling 
in HL v UK.33  The majority of respondents opposed the use of the MHA for the affected 
population, which was primarily older adults with dementia and people with intellectual 
disabilities or autism, mainly on grounds of its perceived stigma.  Thus, a parallel 
     
27 [2005] 40 E.H.R.R. 32; [2004] M.H.L.R 236 277. 
28 Recommendations of Lord Percy, Report of the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness 
and Mental Deficiency. 1954-1957, Cmnd 169 (1957). 
29 HL v UK n 27, at [39]; Health Service Ombudsman, ‘Annual Report for 2001-2: Case No.  E. 2280/98-
99’ (2001). 
30 R. v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust Ex p. L [1999] 1 A.C. 458; [1998] 3 W.L.R. 
107. 
31 HL v UK n27, at [90]. 
32 HL v UK n27, at [91]. 
33 Department of Health, ‘Bournewood’ Consultation’ (2005); Department of Health, 
‘Protecting the Vulnerable: the “Bournewood” Consultation: Summary of Responses’ 
(2006). 
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framework for authorising detention in care homes and hospitals––the DoLS––was 
inserted into the MCA in 2007.34 
 
The DoLS will be compared with the LPS in more detail below. In outline, ‘managing 
authorities’ of hospitals and care homes must recognise that patients or residents are 
deprived of their liberty and must apply to ‘supervisory bodies’ for authorisation. These 
are mainly local authorities; although in Wales, Local Health Boards (LHBs) function as 
supervisory bodies for hospital detentions.  Supervisory bodies must send out a Best 
Interests Assessor (BIA) and a Mental Health Assessor (MHAr) to assess whether six 
‘qualifying requirements’ for detention under the DoLS are met.  If all are met, the 
supervisory body must authorise the detention. Additional safeguards available to the 
‘relevant person’ include the appointment of a ’Relevant Person’s Representative’ 
(RPR), usually from amongst their family and friends, potentially an IMCA (as well as 
or instead of an RPR), reviews by the supervisory body and the right to seek a judicial 
review of the authorisation from the Court of Protection under s21A MCA. 
 
The DoLS are regarded as ‘very much the poor relation of the MHA’:35  notorious for 
their complexity,36 with administrative costs double that of the impact assessment37 
and eye-wateringly expensive litigation.38  Yet they did not provide an effective means 
to challenge detention when the detained person, or those close to them, objected. 
 
The widely reported case of Steven Neary illustrates the difficulties.39 Neary is an 
autistic man with intellectual disabilities who had been living with his father, with 
support funded by the London Borough of Hillingdon.  Following a temporary stay in 
respite care, Hillingdon moved Neary into a ‘positive behaviour unit’ (a registered care 
home) against his wishes and those of this father.  A litany of failures followed, 
including: an initial failure to even seek a DoLS authorisation, a long delay in appointing 
an IMCA to support Steven and his father (who was RPR), and a failure to seriously 
consider Steven’s own wishes and feelings in assessments. It was almost a year before 
the case reached the Court of Protection, in part because the council misled the family 
that it was planning to return Steven home, and in part because Steven’s father was 
scared that if he ‘rocked the boat’ the council might review Steven’s entitlements to 
support if he returned home.40 The Court of Protection discharged the authorisation, 
meaning Steven could return home, and found violations of both article 5 and rights to 
respect for home, family and private life under article 8 ECHR. 
     
34  MCA Scheds A1 and 1A, inserted via the Mental Health Act 2007. 
35 R. Jones, ‘Deprivations of Liberty: Mental Health Act or Mental Capacity Act?’ (2007) 
(16) Journal of Mental Health Law 170-74, [170]. See also: P. Bowen, Blackstone's 
Guide to The Mental Health Act 2007 (Oxford: OUP 2007); R. Hargreaves, ‘The 
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards - essential protection or bureaucratic monster?’ (2009) 
(19) Journal of Mental Health Law 117-27; M. Gunn, ‘Hospital treatment for 
incapacitated adults’, (2009) (17) (2) Medical Law Review, 274-81. 
36 C v Blackburn and Darwen Borough Council [2011] EWHC 3321 (Fam), at [24]; [2012] M.H.L.R. 202. 
House of Lords Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, Report of Session 2013–14 (Mental 
Capacity Act 2005: post-legislative scrutiny) (HL 139), at [271]. 
37 A. Shah and others, ‘Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards in England: implementation costs’, (2011) (199) 
(3) British Journal of Psychiatry, [232-38]. 
38 L Series, P Fennell and J Doughty, n25. 
39 London Borough of Hillingdon v Neary [2011] EWHC 1377 (COP) [2011] 4 All E.R. 
584; [2011] M.H.L.R.  404  
40 Ibid, at [146]. 
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Neary established the principle that disagreements over ‘significant welfare issues’ that 
cannot be resolved by other means should be urgently placed before the Court of 
Protection.41  There is a positive obligation on the state to ensure that a person is ‘not 
only entitled but enabled to have the lawfulness of his detention reviewed speedily by 
a court’ (emphasis added). 42   Following Neary, other local authorities have been 
criticised for using the DoLS to remove people from their homes and families, 
sometimes restricting contact with loved ones, without ensuring these disputes are 
speedily brought to court.43 Overall, the rate of appeal under the DoLS is around one 
per cent,44  whereas the number of people who are said to be objecting to their 
confinement is estimated to be around 30 per cent.45  There is a strong likelihood that 
when the person, or those close to them, objects to detention under the DoLS, they 
are not reliably able to exercise Article 5(4) ECHR rights of challenge. 
 
In 2013-14 the House of Lords Select Committee on the MCA conducted post-legislative 
scrutiny of the 2005 Act.46 Whilst finding that the MCA continues to be held in ‘high 
regard’, the Committee concluded the DoLS were ‘poorly drafted, overly complex’ and 
‘far from being used to protect individuals and their rights, they are sometimes used to 
oppress individuals’.47 It called upon the government to ‘start again’.48 
 
(c) CHESHIRE WEST 
 
The DoLS authorise ‘deprivation of liberty’49, defining this by direct reference to article 
5 ECHR.50 When the DoLS were inserted into the MCA, the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights (JCHR) and others had called for a statutory definition, but the government had 
refused on the basis that it was ‘not possible’ to supply one.51 Managing authorities and 
supervisory bodies adopted their own working definitions of ‘deprivation of liberty’, 
resulting in low and highly variable application rates.  By 2014, it was believed that 
thousands of adults were unlawfully detained.52 
     
41 Ibid, at [33]. 
42 Ibid, at [202]. 
43 Somerset v MK (Deprivation of Liberty: Best Interests Decisions: Conduct of a Local 
Authority) [2014] EWCOP B25; Essex County Council v RF (Deprivation of Liberty and 
damage) [2015] EWCOP 1; Milton Keynes Council v RR [2014] EWCOP B19; SR v A 
Local Authority [2018] EWCOP 36; Local Government Ombudsman, ‘The Right to 
Decide: Towards a greater understanding of mental capacity and deprivation of liberty’ 
(2017) [1], at: 
http://collateral2.vuelio.co.uk/RemoteStorage/LGO/Releases/1176/DOLS%20AND%2
0MCA%20-%20EMB.pdf. 
44 This is the rate of appeals per standard authorisation; the appeal against emergency authorisations or 
applications would be far lower. 
45 ‘Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill: Impact Assessment’ (2018), (n 117). 
46 Mental Capacity Act 2005: post-legislative scrutiny, n36. 
47 Ibid, 7. 
48 Ibid, p7. 
49 MCA Sched A1, s 1-3. 
50 MCA s64(5), as amended. 
51 JCHRFourth Report of Session 2006-07 (Legislative Scrutiny: Mental Health Bill) (HC 
288, HL 40) at [84] and Appendix 3 [52] for government’s response. 
52 HL 139 (2014) n36, [7]; Care Quality Commission, ‘Monitoring the use of the Mental 
Capacity Act Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards in 2012/13’ (2014) at 
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It is not necessary to define deprivation of liberty in order to authorise it (the MHA does 
not). An alternative approach would be to define a list of triggering circumstances when 
the safeguards must apply. This was at one point suggested by the Law Commission in 
their proposals to reform the DoLS (below).53 This approach requires engagement with 
the elusive question posed by Peter Bartlett: what are the DoLS actually for?, beyond 
the circular answer of providing deprivation of liberty safeguards.54  The meaning of 
article 5 is a technical lawyers’ question, ultimately determined by the courts. Asking 
where safeguards would be necessary, beneficial or potentially counterproductive is a 
fundamentally more democratic question, requiring stakeholder consultation and 
parliamentary debate.55 
 
The result of leaving the scope of the DoLS to the courts was, inevitably, near-
continuous litigation on this issue. By 2014 a series of confusing, sometimes 
contradictory and controversial rulings had defined deprivation of liberty so narrowly 
that even a man who had broken down the door of a care home attempting to escape,56 
and a woman wanting to leave a care home to return to her own home,57 were found 
not to be deprived of their liberty.  Thus, the Supreme Court ruling in P v Cheshire West 
and Chester Council and another; P and Q v Surrey County Council 58 on the meaning 
of ‘deprivation of liberty’ in connection with care arrangements for people considered 
unable to consent to their care arrangements was keenly awaited. 
 
The Cheshire West case concerned three people with intellectual disabilities living, 
variously, in a ‘small NHS facility’, a shared apartment with support, and with a foster 
parent.  Being neither hospitals nor registered adult care homes, these were outside 
the limited scope of the DoLS, meaning authorisation would require costly annual court 
applications.59 Delivering the leading judgment, Lady Hale relied upon what she took 
to be the ratio in HL v UK and later cases before the ECtHR,60 holding that the ‘acid 
test’ of deprivation of liberty is whether a person is subject to continuous supervision 
and control and not free to leave.61 That they are not objecting, that the arrangements 
are the least restrictive possible and in their best interests, or ‘normal’ for a person with 
     
http://www.cqc.org.uk/public/news/protecting-people%E2%80%99s-human-rights-
when-they-cannot-consent-treatment. 
53 Law Commission, Mental capacity and deprivation of liberty: A consultation paper (Consultation Paper 
222, 2015) Provisional proposals 7-2 – 7-4. 
54 P. Bartlett, ‘Reforming the deprivation of liberty safeguards (DoLS): What is it that we want?’ (2014) 
20 (3) Web Journal of Current Legal Issues, http://webjcli.org/article/view/355. 
55 A. Ruck Keene, written evidence to the JCHR’s 2018 inquiry into The Right Freedom 
and Safety, at: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument
/human-rights-committee/the-right-to-freedom-and-safety-reform-of-the-deprivation-
of-liberty-safeguards/written/80869.pdf. 
 
56 C v Blackburn and Darwen Borough Council, n36. 
57 CC v KK and STCC [2012] EWHC 2136 (COP) at [99] [2012] C.O.P.L.R. 627. 
58  [2014] UKSC 19; [2014] A.C. 896. 
59 Salford City Council v BJ (Incapacitated Adult) [2009] EWHC 3310 (Fam); [2010] M.H.L.R. 283. 
60 Stanev v Bulgaria; D.D. v Lithuania, n15; Kędzior v Poland [2013] M.H.L.R. 115; 
BAILII 2012 ECHR 1809; Mihailovs v Latvia [2014] M.H.L.R. 87; BAILII 2013 ECHR 65. 
61 Cheshire West, n 58, at [48]-[49]. 
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a similar condition, is irrelevant to the question of whether they are deprived of their 
liberty (but relevant to whether it is justified).  
 
Whether Cheshire West  is a landmark human rights victory or a perverse interpretation 
of article 5 ECHR is hotly debated. 62  It’s practical consequences, however, are 
undeniably challenging.  Within a year of the 2014 judgment, the volume of DoLS 
applications increased by more than a factor of ten and continued to rise, as depicted 
in Figure 1. In 2018-19 supervisory bodies in England received 240,455 DoLS 
applications and they had acquired a backlog of over 131,350 unprocessed 
applications.63 The Association of Directors of Adult Social Services produced a ‘priority 
tool’64 to help supervisory bodies work out––in the words of the JCHR––‘how best to 
break the law’.65 
 
 
Figure 1 Estimated and actual annual detentions under the MHA, the DoLS and the LPS66 
     
62 E.g. I. Burgess, ‘We should welcome this Supreme Court ruling- it enshrines social work values in law’ 
Community Care (London, 12 September 2014); Care Quality Commission, Monitoring the use of the 
Mental Capacity Act Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards in 2013-14 (2015); D. Whitaker, ‘Social justice for 
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Following Cheshire West an estimated 53,000 people outside the scope of the DoLS 
scheme will require safeguards.67 This acid test encompasses people in supported living 
schemes, as well as people in private homes, receiving publicly or privately arranged 
care, or even care delivered by families themselves, known as ‘domestic DoLS’.68  The 
judgment also means that thousands of 16 and 17 year olds and other children in the 
care of the State would require detention safeguards. 69   The Law Commission 
estimated that if these populations were given safeguards compliant with article 5 ECHR 
(which they were not),70 the overall cost of the existing scheme would exceed £2bn a 
year.71 The father of Steven Neary subsequently told the JCHR that the Council that 
had unlawfully detained him now sought authorisation for alleged deprivation of liberty 
in his own home.72 
 
An analysis of Cheshire West is beyond the scope of this article,73 but it was the key 
precipitating factor for the extraordinary increase in detentions under the MCA and the 
operational challenges facing both DoLS and the LPS.  Its underpinning policy rationale, 
spelled out by Lady Hale, was that if the appellants were not found to be ‘deprived of 
their liberty’––then––‘no independent check is made’ on whether their care 
arrangements are in their best interests.74 The ‘extreme vulnerability’ of the affected 
population means we should ‘err on the side of caution’ when deciding what constitutes 
a deprivation of liberty.75   
 
It might plausibly be argued that Cheshire West was a legal response to the minimal 
procedural safeguards available under the MCA and wider concerns about the provision 
of adult social care. 
 
(d) THE LAW COMMISSION 
 
     
Mental Deficiency Acts from appendices of Report of the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental 
Illness and Mental Deficiency, n 28; data from impact assessments for the Bournewood consultations (n 
33) and the Mental Capacity Amendment Bill (n 5); MHA detentions data from NHS Digital (n 5). 
67 ‘Impact Assessment: Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill’ (2019) n 5. 
68 Rochdale MBC v KW [2014] EWCOP 45; [2015] 2 F.C.R. 244 [2015] Med. L.R. 19. The London Borough 
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[2016] Fam. 419. SSJ v Staffordshire CC & Ors  [2016] EWCA Civ 1317; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 1131 [2017] 
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EWCOP 20; [2015] C.O.P.L.R. 337. SCC v MSA & Anor [2017] EWCOP 18. 
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County Council v MD, FD and RD BAILII 2018 EWFC 47; Trust A v X and A Local Authority [2015] EWHC 
922 (Fam);; A Local Authority v D [2015] EWHC 3125 (Fam); Re D (A Child) [2017] EWCA Civ 1695; Re 
D (A Child) [2019] UKSC 42. 
70 A McNicoll, ‘Councils’ failure to make court applications leaving ‘widespread unlawful deprivations of 
liberty’ a year after Cheshire West ruling’ Community Care (London, 17 June 2015) at: 
https://www.communitycare.co.uk/2015/06/17/councils-failure-make-court-applications-leaving-
widespread-unlawful-deprivations-liberty-year-cheshire-west-ruling/. 
71 Law Commission, Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty (Law Com No 372, 2017). 
72 JCHR, The Right to Freedom and Safety: Reform of the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards, n 65. 
73 I discuss the judgment in L Series, ‘Making sense of Cheshire West’ in Claire Spivakovsky, Linda Steele 
and Penelope Weller (Eds) The Legacies of Institutionalisation: Disability, Law and Policy in the 
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75 Ibid, at [57]. 
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The government asked the Law Commission to review the DoLS. They concluded the 
DoLS were indeed broken and in need of reform: too complex, too inflexible, their scope 
too limited, with a lack of oversight and effective safeguards.76 The DoLS were too 
narrowly focussed on article 5––‘a technical legal solution to a technical legal 
problem’77––when the key substantive issues were better captured by article 8 ECHR–
–rights to enjoyment of home, family and private life.  
 
The Commission’s initial proposals for two tiers of safeguards, promoting a wider range 
of rights, were scaled back to a framework for authorising deprivation of liberty––the 
LPS––and modest amendments to the MCA.78 To align the MCA more closely to the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 79  the Commission 
proposed placing ‘particular weight’ on the wishes and feelings of the person in best 
interests decisions,80 and a statutory framework for supported decision making.81  As 
an intermediate safeguard, they recommended that the general defence should only 
be available for very serious decisions if certain information were recorded.82  They also 
proposed a new tort of unlawful deprivation of liberty,83 and provisions for ‘advance 
consent’ to a potential deprivation of liberty.84  Subsequently the JCHR largely endorsed 
the Law Commission’s approach.85 
 
(e) THE MENTAL CAPACITY (AMENDMENT) BILL 
 
In July 2018 the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill86 was tabled in the House of Lords. 
There had been no further public consultation, yet the Bill differed from the Law 
Commission’s proposals in important respects. 87  The government estimated the 
‘adjusted’ LPS scheme in the Bill would save over £200m per year,88 whilst improving 
and extending existing safeguards and fixing an overwhelmed system. Even the 
     
76 Law Commission (2015) n 53. 
77 Ibid, at [2.15], citing P. Bartlett n 52. 
78 Law Com (2017), n 71. 
79 Analysis of article 12 CRPD is beyond the scope of this paper, but see: P. Bartlett, ‘The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Mental Health Law’ (2012) 75 (5) Modern Law 
Review , 752-78; R. Harding, ‘The Rise of Statutory Wills and the Limits of Best Interests Decision-Making 
in Inheritance’ (2015) 78 (6) Modern Law Review , 945-70; E. Jackson, ‘From ‘Doctor Knows Best’ to 
Dignity: Placing Adults Who Lack Capacity at the Centre of Decisions About Their Medical Treatment’, 
(2018) 81 (2) Modern Law Review, 247-81; L. Series, ‘The Place of Wishes and Feelings in Best Interests 
Decisions: Wye Valley NHS Trust v Mr B’ (2016) 79 (6) Modern Law Review , 1101-15. 
80 Law Com No 372, n 71, recommendation 40. 
81 Ibid, recommendation 42. 
82 Ibid, recommendation 41. 
83 Ibid, recommendation 45. 
84 Ibid, recommendation 43. 
85 JCHR, The Right to Freedom and Safety, n 65. 
86 Information about the Bill’s progress, including different versions of the Bill, amendments, links to 
debates in Hansard, Ministerial ‘will write’ letters and other supporting documentation can be found on 
its parliamentary website: https://services.parliament.uk/Bills/2017-19/mentalcapacityamendment.html. 
87 Compare and contrast: HM Government, ‘Final Government Response to the Law Commission's review 
of Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards and Mental Capacity’ (Department of Health and Social Care written 
statement, 14th March 2018) at http://qna.files.parliament.uk/ws-
attachments/861932/original/180314%20Response%20to%20Law%20Commission%20on%20DoLS%
20-%20final.pdf; Department of Health and Social Care, ‘Annex A: Law Commission recommendations 
and Government Responses’ (Attached to 'will write' letter from Lord O'Shaughnessy to peers dated 
24/07/18) at http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/files/DEP2018-
0796/Annex_A__Law_Commission_Recommendation_and_govt._action.pdf . 
88 Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill (Revised IA, dated 31/01/2019, 2019) n 5. 
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Minister responsible––Lord O’Shaughnessy––commented that this sounded almost ‘too 
good to be true’.89 
 
To the dismay of organisations representing disabled people, the scope of the Bill was 
narrowly focused on article 5 ECHR, without the amendments to bring the MCA closer 
to the CRPD.90 Gone too was the tort of unlawful deprivation of liberty, provisions for 
advance consent and requirements for a written record for serious decisions. The 
government’s Bill was considerably shorter than the Law Commission’s, with many 
clauses and provisions omitted.91 The government insisted that key operational details 
could be included in the Code of Practice, despite recent confirmation that the MCA’s 
codes cannot create legal obligations that are not already established via other sources 
of law.92 
 
The Bill was heavily criticised by stakeholders, including: professional bodies,93 local 
government, 94   care providers, 95  civil rights organisations, 96  and organisations 
representing older and disabled people.97 Almost 200,000 people signed a petition 
     
89 Hansard, HL Series 5, (2nd Reading) Vol 792 col 1106 (16 July 2018). 
90 See written evidence of People First and Inclusion London to the Public Bill Committee (MCAB46) (n 
86), and G. Loomes, ‘The Mental Capacity Legislation and Our Human Rights’ Report commissioned by 
Inclusion London, 2019) at: https://www.inclusionlondon.org.uk/uncategorised/inclusion-londons-
report-mental-capacity-and-our-human-rights/. 
91 The Law Commission’s draft Bill was 33 pages long (Appendix A, Law Commission No 372, n 71). The 
Bill as introduced in July 2018 (HL Bill 117, n 86) was only 25 pages long. 
92 An NHS Trust & Ors v Y & Anor[2018] UKSC 46; [2019] A.C. 978 , at [97]. 
93 British Association of Social Workers, ‘BASW England response to the Mental Capacity (Amendment) 
Bill’ (October 2018) at https://www.basw.co.uk/media/news/2018/oct/basw-england-response-mental-
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(Amendment) Bill – ADASS Statement – 4th September 2018’, at: https://www.adass.org.uk/adass-
responds-to-mental-capacity-amendment-bill; Law Society, ‘Parliamentary briefing: Mental Capacity 
(Amendment) Bill – House of Lords committee stage’ (2018) at https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/policy-
campaigns/public-affairs/parliamentary-briefing/parliamentary-briefing-mental-capacity-amendment-
bill-hol-committee-stage/.  See evidence submitted to the Public Bill Committee (n 86) by the British 
Medical Association, Royal College of Psychiatrists, Royal College of Nursing, and the Royal College of 
Speech and Language Therapists. 
94 Local Government Association, ‘Briefing: The Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill Committee stage, 
House of Lords’ (5 September 2018), at: 
https://www.local.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/LGA%20briefing%20-
%20The%20Mental%20Capacity%20%28Amendment%29%20Bill%20-%20CMTTEE%20HL%20-
%2005092018%20FINAL.pdf. 
95 These were largely led by the Voluntary Organisations Disability Group and Care England, see for 
example: ‘A cross-sector representation of issues and concerns relating to the Mental Capacity 
(Amendment) Bill HL’ (October 2018), with 16 signatories, at: https://www.vodg.org.uk/news/leading-
social-care-interest-groups-warn-government-that-its-mental-capacity-reforms-are-not-fit-for-purpose/; 
Care England, Conflict of Interest (2018)  < http://www.careengland.org.uk/news/conflict-interest-0 ; 
Dimensions, ‘Dimensions briefing on the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill (16 July 2018)’ (2018) at 
https://www.dimensions-uk.org/press-release/mental-capacity-amendment-bill-briefing/; Care England, 
Conflict of Interest (2018) http://www.careengland.org.uk/news/conflict-interest-0. 
96 Liberty, ‘To protect vulnerable people, the government must fix the Mental Capacity Amendment Bill’ 
(14 January 2019), at: https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/news/blog/protect-vulnerable-people-
government-must-fix-mental-capacity-amendment-bill. 
97 Age UK, ‘Briefing: Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill (HL) Committee Stage – October 2018’, at: 
https://www.ageuk.org.uk/globalassets/age-uk/documents/reports-and-publications/reports-and-
briefings/health--wellbeing/age-uk-briefing---mental-capacity-amendment-bill-hl-committee--stage---
august-18.pdf; Inclusion London,  ‘Inclusion London’s Briefing on the Mental Capacity Amendment Bill’ 
(September 2018), at: https://www.inclusionlondon.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Briefing-on-
the-Mental-Capacity-Amendment-Bill-for-DDPOs.pdf; ‘Mental Capacity Act (Amendment) Bill Briefing 
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calling for better protection of the rights of disabled people.98 Peers declared the Bill 
‘one of the worst pieces of legislation ever brought before this House’.99 
 
The Bill proceeded in haste. Parliamentarians complained of excessively short sitting 
times and insufficient time to consider government amendments.100 It progressed in 
parallel to an independent review of the MHA,101 meaning many key matters about the 
relationship of detention under the MCA to mental health law were debated before the 
review had made its final recommendations.102  Accessible materials on the Bill for 
disabled people were produced too late in the Parliamentary process for any significant 
contributions to amendments or debate.103 Key decisions––for example, over whether 
to include a statutory definition of deprivation of liberty––were made so late the Bill 
entered ‘Ping Pong’104. Considerable energy was expended fighting major problems, 
such as the ‘care home arrangements’, whilst issues that emerged later around 
advocacy, renewals, and ‘domestic’ deprivation of liberty received limited attention.  
The government maintained there was an urgent need for action following Cheshire 
West.105 But the frantic pace of the Bill could also be explained by fears that it would 
be overtaken by wider political events connected with Brexit.106 
 
III. THE (ADJUSTED) LIBERTY PROTECTION SAFEGUARDS 
 
     
from Third sector Second Reading [Commons]’, signed by Mencap, National Autistic Society, Mind, 
Rethink Mental Illness, Alzheimer’s Society, VoiceAbility, Disability Rights UK, POhWER, Parkinson’s UK, 
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receiving-care-and-support. 
99 Hansard, HL Series 5,Vol 794 col 1247 (12 November 2019) (The Baroness Barker). 
100 E.g. Hansard, HL 5 Series Vol 794 col 593 (27 November 2018); Hansard, HC 6 Series Vol 651 col 
731 – and col 754 (18 December 2018); Hansard, HC Public Bill Committee (1st Sitting) col 10  (15 
January 2019); Hansard, HC Public Bill Committee (6th Sitting) col 186 (22 January 2019); Hansard, HC 
Series 6 (Report Stage) Vol 654col 847 (12 February 2019). 
101 ‘Modernising the Mental Health Act’, n17. 
102 Ibid. The review was published on 6 December 2018, at which point the Bill was approaching its third 
reading in the House of Lords. 
103 Department of Health and Social Care, ‘Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill: easy read’ (published 31 
January 2019) at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mental-capacity-amendment-bill-easy-
read; Department of Health and Social Care, Equality Analysis: Liberty Protection Safeguards – Mental 
Capacity (Amendment) Bill (published 17 December 2018)  
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104 This is a process in the UK Parliament where amendments are passed back and forth between the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords until agreement can be reached.  
105 Hansard, HC Series 6 (2nd Reading) Vol 651 cols 730 and 756 (18 December 2018). 
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The main distinguishing characteristic of the LPS from the DoLS is their flexibility in 
where and how they operate.  Greater flexibility is necessary to cope with the scale and 
diversity of deprivation of liberty following Cheshire West, yet this inevitably inserts 
complexity, discretion and the potential dilution of safeguards. 
 
(a) FROM ‘ACCOMMODATION’ TO ‘ARRANGEMENTS’ 
 
The DoLS construct deprivation of liberty as a function of being ‘accommodated’ in a 
care home or hospital.107 The LPS deal instead with ‘arrangements’ to ‘enable’ care or 
treatment that ‘give rise to’ a deprivation of liberty. 108  The authorisation of 
‘arrangements’ is more fluid, applying to potentially any setting, multiple settings, and 
transfers between settings. The Commission hoped this would give responsible bodies 
greater control over ‘the ways in which a person may justifiably be deprived of 
liberty’,109 instead of approaching detention as a binary question.110  For example, 
authorising arrangements involving one set of restrictions, but not others.111  
 
The drafters of the LPS envisioned a ‘bright line’ distinction between the arrangements 
to enable care and treatment that give rise to a deprivation of liberty, and the 
underlying care and treatment decisions themselves. The LPS can only authorise the 
former, whilst care and treatment decisions would continue to be made informally 
under the general defence112, or by attorneys or deputies. The MHA also distinguishes 
between authorisation of detention and treatment,113 but the need for assessment or 
treatment is still built into the admission and review criteria.114  It is unclear how far 
assessments, reviews and legal challenges under the LPS must take underlying care 
and treatment decisions as an indisputable starting point for the arrangements, with 
the only question left for the LPS to resolve whether the person should be deprived of 
their liberty to achieve these, or whether care and treatment decisions can themselves 
be scrutinised within the LPS processes. It may not always be conceptually or practically 
straightforward to distinguish care and treatment decisions from the arrangements to 
enable these. This issue will be revisited below.   
 
(b) THE AUTHORISATION PROCESS 
 
Article 5(1) requires deprivation of liberty to be in accordance with ‘fair and proper 
procedures’ executed ‘by an appropriate authority’.115  The DoLS procedure required 
managing authorities of care homes and hospitals to apply to supervisory bodies for 
authorisation of a deprivation of liberty. This often led to a ‘carousel’,116 where public 
bodies commissioned care or treatment then required managing authorities to seek 
authorisation from them for it.  The LPS seek to ‘streamline’ assessments into existing 
     
107 E.g. MCA Sched A1 s15; MCA Sched A1 s20(1). 
108 MCA Sched AA1 s2. 
109 Law Com 372 (n 71) at [1.29]. 
110 Ibid, [9.7]. 
111 This may potentially operate in a similar way as the power of the supervisory body to set conditions 
on  a DoLS authorisation: MCA Sch A1 s 53. 
112 Law Com 372 (n71) at [10.14]. See also: Department of Health and Social Care, ‘Mental Capacity 
(Amendment) Act 2019: Explanatory Notes’ (2019) at [35], 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2019/18/notes/contents.  
113 MHA 1983 Part IV. 
114 E.g. s2(2)(a) MHA, s3(2)(a) s3(2)(d); s72(1)(a)(i), s72(1)(b)(i), s71(1)(b)(iia) MHA. 
115 Winterwerp v the Netherlands (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 387, at [45]. 
116 Law Com 372, n 71, at [1.27]. 
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care and treatment planning processes.117 Local authorities, NHS hospitals, clinical 
commissioning groups (CCGs) and LHBs serve as ‘responsible bodies’ where they 
provide or commission the care themselves.118 They may authorise the arrangements 
provided they are satisfied that the LPS apply,119 the authorisation conditions are met, 
and they comply with the procedural requirements described below.120 
 
Some administrative burdens will therefore be redistributed from local authorities to 
other NHS bodies.  However, local authorities will still receive the highest proportion of 
applications; both because they commission the greatest number of care placements 
and because the hierarchical approach adopted121 leaves them with responsibilities for 
privately arranged care, care provided informally by friends or family, and––owing to 
concerns about financial conflicts of interest––independent hospitals.  
 
(c) CARE HOME ARRANGEMENTS 
 
The largest proportion of DoLS and LPS applications concern people living in residential 
care.122  The Ggovernment’s ‘adjusted’123 LPS model introduced a new and separate 
procedure for authorising arrangements in residential care settings: the ‘care home 
arrangements’.124  The care home arrangements flow from the desire to ‘streamline’ 
the LPS into existing care planning processes, and relieve pressure on local authorities.  
 
The Ggovernment’s initial idea was that care home managers could take on some 
functions otherwise performed by the responsible body, albeit with local authorities as 
responsible bodies still holding overall responsibility for issuing the authorisation.  Care 
home managers were to arrange all LPS assessments themselves and make certain 
critical decisions around representation and advocacy. The responsible body would 
conduct a pre-authorisation review based on a statement by the care home manager.125  
Yet, the government assured care providers it would be the responsible body who 
would be liable if things went wrong.126 
 
The care home arrangements were not consulted upon by the government.  
Professional bodies, local government bodies and care providers themselves expressed 
concerns about financial conflicts of interest, the competence and ability of care homes 
to conduct the relevant assessments, and the impact of these additional responsibilities 
on an already struggling sector.127 No additional resources were allocated for this 
     
117 E.g. under the Care Act 2014; the Social Services and Well-being Act 2014; or the NHS Act 2006. 
118 MCA Sch AA1, ss 6-12. 
119 The test of whether the LPS ‘applies’ concerns its interface with the MHA, provided for by Part 7 of 
Schedule AA1 and discussed below. 
120 MCA Sch AA1, s17-18. 
121 MCA Sch AA1 s6, s10. 
122 71 per cent of all DoLS applications in 2017-18 were from care homes (residential or nursing).  NHS 
Digital (n 12). 
123 The Government described the scheme contained in the 2018 Bill as the “Adjusted Liberty Protection 
Safeguards’” – Department of Health and Social Care, Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill: Impact 
Assessment (2018) 1. 
124 MCA Sch AA1 s17(i), defined s3. 
125 See initial version of the Bill, dated July 2018 (n86). 
126 ‘Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill: Impact Assessment’ (2018), (n 117) at [8.9]. 
127 See n 90, n 91, n 92, n 93. 
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assessment and administration role.128 There were concerns that care homes might 
pass these costs on to residents.129 
 
The government initially argued that LPS assessments by the responsible body would 
‘duplicate’ those already being undertaken by care homes.130  Yet more than half of all 
care home placements are at least partially funded and arranged by local authorities or 
the NHS131, ergo reintroducing the ‘carousel’ the Commission had sought to remove.  
Furthermore, the assessments undertaken for the LPS are distinct from those 
undertaken by care homes for operational purposes.  Simply put, the LPS are concerned 
with examining the proposed arrangements in comparison with potential alternative 
options;including those in other settings than the care home.  This is integral to the 
‘least restriction’ principle contained in the MCA, DoLS and LPS, and is also a necessary 
ingredient of capacity assessments.132 Conversely, it is unlikely that the care home’s 
own internal assessments––under the MCA––would  explore alternative arrangements 
other than those that the care home could put in place. It is not the role of the care 
home manager to investigate other possible places where the person could receive care 
and support. 
 
The care home arrangements were fiercely criticised in the Lords. The government 
responded by giving the responsible body discretion over whether they or the care 
home hold the reins in arranging the assessments.133 Where the care home does, 
regulations will prohibit anybody with a ‘prescribed connection’ to the care home from 
conducting the key assessments. This is to protect against conflicts of interest.134 Care 
homes will therefore be forbidden from relying upon their own internal assessments 
and will be required to source these from other professionals; yet it is unclear who will 
provide these assessments. This may be relatively straightforward when local authority 
and NHS professionals arrange care on behalf of these public bodies, however privately 
arranged care will not necessarily involve independent professional assessments under 
the MCA.  This issue is revisited for the different assessments below.  
 
(d) AUTHORISATION CONDITIONS AND ASSESSMENTS 
 
The DoLS have six qualifying requirements, assessed by the Best Interests Assessor 
(BIA) or the Mental Health Assessor (MHAr). The government boasted of reducing this 
to three assessments under the LPS:135 medical, mental capacity and ‘necessary and 
proportionate’.  In reality, responsible bodies will still need to be assured of similar 
criteria and make similar determination as under the DoLS.136 What has changed is who 
can determine whether these are met. 
 
(e) AGE 
     
128 ‘Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill: Impact Assessment’ (2018), (n Error! Bookmark not defined.) at [8.6], [12.16]. 
129 Hansard, HC Public Bill Committee (1st Sitting) col 67 (15 January 2019) (Alex Cunningham MP); 
Hansard, HC Series 6 (Report Stage)  Vol 654 col 824 (12 February 2019) (Alex Cunningham MP). 
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Although the MCA applies from age 16 upwards,137 the DoLS only applied to people 
aged over 18.138 However, following Cheshire West 139 potentially thousands of children 
and young people in the care of the state are considered to be deprived of their 
liberty.140 At present, these must be authorised by the courts. The Law Commission 
recommended that the LPS apply to 16 and 17 year olds.141 The government accepted 
this recommendation,142 and the LPS will apply from 16 upwards.143 The care home 
arrangements, however, only apply from 18 upwards.144 
 
(f) MENTAL DISORDER 
 
Article 5(1) ECHR permits detention only on certain limited grounds, including 
‘unsoundness of mind’.145 This ground directly conflicts with article 14 CRPD,146 which 
provides that ‘the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of 
liberty.’ 147  The Law Commission concluded that the CRPD Committee’s approach 
required ‘a greater process of change over a much longer timescale’,148 prioritising (for 
now) compliance with the ECHR. 
 
Article 5(1)(e) requires ‘objective medical evidence’ of a ‘true mental disorder’ of a ‘kind 
or degree warranting compulsory confinement’.149  The DoLS ‘mental health’ criterion 
employs the definition of ‘mental disorder’ established by the MHA––‘any disorder or 
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disability of the mind’150––but with a qualification restricting the MHA’s application to 
people with learning disabilities151 removed.   
 
The Law Commissioners were concerned that this potentially excluded people with 
‘pure’ brain disorders, such as a stroke.152  It is not obvious why this would not 
constitute a ‘disorder or disability of the mind’, but this may reflect a cultural reluctance 
within psychiatry to apply the MHA to these populations. To accommodate these cases, 
the Commission initially proposed use of the MCA’s diagnostic threshold––‘an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’153––but later 
concluded that this was too broad. Applying Goldilocks logic, they eventually 
recommended a test of ‘unsoundness of mind’ for its fit with article 5(1)(e). 154  
Predictably this caused widespread offence, and the government amended the Bill so 
that the LPS now employs the same ‘mental disorder’ test as the DoLS.155 
 
The DoLS require the ‘mental health’ assessment to be conducted by the MHAr, who 
must be a registered medical professional with specialist qualifications and 
experience.156 However the LPS do not replicate this role; there is limited specification 
of who can undertake the ‘medical assessment’ of whether a person has a mental 
disorder. The Law Commission noted ‘encouraging developments’ in Strasbourg 
suggesting ‘general practitioners, psychologists and psychotherapists’ could provide the 
necessary medical evidence157, and the government repeated this in parliamentary 
debates.158 Medical professional bodies were concerned that the 2019 amendments did 
not require those undertaking the ‘medical assessment’ to have medical 
qualifications.159 The ECtHR has more recently indicated that in some circumstances 
psychiatric expertise is necessary.160 Statutory ‘requirements’ for those undertaking LPS 
medical assessments has been deferred to regulations.161  Initial impact assessments 
indicate the government expects GP’s to perform LPS medical assessments for free.162 
However, there is no mandatory obligation on them to do so and charging regulations 
do not prohibit them from charging patients for this.163  
 
(g) MENTAL CAPACITY  
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The DoLS require assessment of whether the person has the mental capacity to decide 
‘whether or not he should be accommodated in the relevant hospital or care home for 
the purpose of being given the relevant care or treatment.’164 This assessment may be 
conducted either by the BIA or the MHAr. Of the six DoLS qualifying requirements, 
‘mental capacity’ is the one that is most frequently found not to be met by DoLS 
assessors.165 
 
Under the LPS, the assessment of mental capacity no longer concerns accommodation 
but ‘consent to the arrangements’.166 Here, the tricky distinction between care and 
treatment and detention itself, which also figures under the DoLS, comes into sharp 
relief.  Do the LPS require capacity assessors, reviewers, and the Court of Protection to 
only consider whether a person can make decisions about the ‘arrangements’ to 
facilitate care and treatment, not the underlying care and treatment decision itself?  For 
example, should LPS capacity assessors simply accept––without question–– underlying 
assessments that a person lacks capacity to consent (or refuse) a specific treatment, 
or to restrict contact with loved ones, or even where to live? If a regime of supervision 
and control is imposed to prevent sexual activity on the basis that a person lacks the 
capacity to consent to sex,167 must the LPS capacity assessment start from the premise 
that this assessment is correct and merely consider the arrangements to secure this 
protection? The Code may offer guidance here, but the issue forces a reckoning with 
the underlying question of what the LPS are safeguards against. 
 
Regulations will ‘make provision’ for who can provide a capacity assessment under the 
LPS.168 For care home arrangements, assessments cannot be undertaken by anyone 
with a ‘prescribed connection’ to the care home.169  Care homes will therefore need to 
source capacity assessments from third parties. Where care is publicly funded or 
arranged, public bodies should in theory have undertaken capacity assessments for the 
care and treatment itself. For private self-funders, it is less likely that independent 
professionals will have assessed a person’s capacity to consent to care arrangements, 
as local authority social workers or NHS professionals will be less likely to have arranged 
or commissioned the care.  The government appears to believe that GPs will also 
conduct LPS capacity assessments for free,170 yet they play little role in most decisions 
concerning residential care.  This promises to be a major practical sticking point for the 
LPS unless resolved. 
 
Although regulations specify who can conduct capacity and medical assessments, the 
responsible body or care home manager must ‘determine’ whether these authorisation 
conditions are met.171 The ‘determination’ may be based on a previous LPS assessment, 
or an assessment for another purpose, provided it appears ‘that it is reasonable to rely 
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on the assessment’,172 having regard to: the length of time since it was carried out, its 
purpose, and whether there has been a change in the person’s condition.173  
 
IV. FROM ‘BEST INTERESTS’ TO ‘NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE’ 
 
Detention under article 5(1)(e) ECHR must be necessary and proportionate with regard 
to the risk of harm to the person or to others.174 Additionally, and so far as is possible, 
protective measures should reflect ‘the wishes of individuals capable of expressing their 
will’.175 These elements of the lawfulness of deprivation of liberty are dealt with under 
the LPS’s new ‘necessary and proportionate’ test, which replaces the DoLS ‘best 
interests’ assessment. 
 
The DoLS’ best interests assessment is regarded by many as the ‘cornerstone’ of the 
authorisation process.176 It must be conducted by the BIA, typically a social worker, 
who must have specialist skills, training and experience177, and be independent of the 
person’s care and treatment.178  The BIA must determine whether it is in the person’s 
‘best interests’ to be a ‘detained resident’, whether it is necessary for them to be 
detained ‘in order to prevent harm to the relevant person’ and whether this is a 
proportionate response to the likelihood and seriousness of that person suffering harm 
if they were not detained.179  In practice, it is extremely rare for the ‘best interests’ 
requirement of the DoLS to be found not to be met.180 However, it is possible that the 
process of assessment, and the potential for BIA’s to recommend ‘conditions’ for 
authorisation, may still lead to reduced restrictions or substantive changes to care 
arrangements.  No data are collected on this, however. 
 
BIAs told the Law Commission that the test could be difficult to apply in practice. Unlike 
the MHA, risk of harm to others is not a potential ground for detention under the DoLS. 
However, at the fringes of the DoLS were cases like P v A Local Authority 181, where 
the real reason for the restrictions were less to prevent harm to the person than to 
others.182  This included cases (like P’s) of young men with intellectual disabilities who 
were sexually attracted to children, as well as people who sometimes acted aggressively 
towards other residents or loved ones, or people who might otherwise be detained 
under the MHA. It was sometimes argued that it is in a person’s best interests to 
prevent them from harming others, for example if they themselves would have wished 
to be prevented from hurting other people, or to prevent serious consequential risks 
such as a community backlash, imprisonment or detention in hospital under the MHA.183  
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In P v A Local Authority, the authorisation was discharged by the Court of Protection 
as not being necessary and proportionate in relation to the risk to P himself.  
Reportedly, P subsequently offended and was imprisoned. 184   The Commission’s 
suggestion of including a new ground of risk of harm to others within the best interests 
test 185  received a mixed response at consultation: some viewed this as avoiding 
intellectual dishonesty or more restrictive measures, others were nervous about the 
MCA straying into the traditional public protection terrain of the MHA.  Some asked 
‘how far can this be taken before it goes beyond the remit of the Mental Capacity 
Act’?186 
 
The Commission also heard that BIAs found it hard to describe some care arrangements 
as being in the ‘best interests’ of a person, when in reality they were the only available 
option.187  The best interests test, the Commission concluded, added ‘nothing’ to the 
assessment in the ‘vast majority of cases’,188 but added ‘complications’189 in cases 
where the real concern was harm to others. They reached a radical conclusion: abolish 
the DoLS best interests requirement altogether, and replace it with a new test of 
whether the deprivation of liberty was necessary and proportionate with regard to 
either the risk of harm to the person or to others.190  This test reflected the position 
under the ECHR191 and could accommodate cases like P’s.192 
 
The Commission envisioned the MCA’s best interests principle still playing a role in 
‘formulating the arrangements as a whole’, strengthened by their wider proposed 
reforms to the MCA.193 Yet they – and later the independent review of the MHA – 
acknowledged that the MCA’s ‘best interests’ principle sits uneasily alongside public 
protection.194  It was unclear whether the Commission intended that the LPS would 
empower responsible bodies to authorise arrangements that could potentially be said 
not to be in the person’s best interests, extending powers of detention under the LPS 
beyond the traditional remit of the MCA, and bringing the MCA’s detention framework 
into conflict with its main statutory principles. 
 
The initial version of the government’s Bill did not specify what detention must be 
‘necessary and proportionate’ in relation to, as the MHA review was simultaneously 
considering the matter.195 The government subsequently confirmed the LPS would 
include risk of harm to others,196 but this would only be spelled out in the Code of 
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Practice.197  However there was no discussion of this issue in in any of the Bill’s 
supporting materials, so it was unclear how the new test would sit alongside the wider 
provisions of the MCA, or how open ended it might be. The Minister appeared to believe 
(incorrectly) that this mirrored the existing position under the DoLS.198 
 
Significant potential dilemmas arise in extending this ground of detention to include 
risk of harm to others.  It would introduce a new public protection ethos within the 
MCA that is alien to its foundational principles. It would create new powers to detain 
on public protection grounds with very weak safeguards, and no consideration has been 
given to whether this might be used for new and unintended populations. It would, 
paradoxically, give public bodies administrative powers of detention on public 
protection grounds that cannot be exercised by the Court of Protection itself. And there 
is a risk of highly complex interactions with the rest of the MCA when detention could 
be authorised under the LPS but cannot be justified on best interests grounds. The 
Lords voted to restrict the necessary and proportionate test to risk of harm to the 
person themselves,199 and the government did not seek to reverse this. Consequently, 
‘risk of harm to others’ is not grounds for detention under the LPS.200 Shortly afterwards 
the MHA review recommended including a ground of harm to others to enable the LPS 
to authorise inpatient detention in some circumstances where the MHA currently has 
to be used.201 This issue may be revisited in a future mental health bill.  
 
Those making necessary and proportionate ‘determinations’ must have regard ‘to the 
cared-for person’s wishes and feelings in relation to the arrangements’.202  Although 
the DoLS’ best interests test also required this203, wishes and feelings – and the need 
for strong justification to override these - assume greater visibility in the LPS.  This is 
arguably one benefit of removing the ‘best interests’ test, and may be an incremental 
step towards the emphasis on the ‘will and preferences’ of the person required by the 
CRPD.204 However the presence of LPS criteria linked to disability will continue to 
remain an obstacle for CRPD compliance. 
 
Once again, questions arise over how far consideration of underlying care and 
treatment decisions bleed into determinations of whether the arrangements are 
necessary and proportionate. For example, should those making the determination 
consider whether restrictions on contact with named persons, or finely balanced or 
contested medical treatments, are themselves necessary and proportionate?  The 
ECtHR has recently clarified that article 5(1)(e) imposes an obligation to ensure 
‘appropriate and individualised therapy, based on the specific features of the 
compulsory confinement’. The court did not analyse the specific content of treatment, 
but sought to confirm that ‘an individualised programme’ was in place.205  LPS assessors 
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will therefore need to make some enquiries into the ‘therapeutic’ purpose of detention.  
Notably, the government also intended the LPS to protect article 8 rights,206 implying 
some consideration of underlying care and treatment decisions. 
 
Regulations will specify who may undertake the ‘necessary and proportionate’ 
determination. If the arrangements are ‘care home arrangements’ they may not have 
a ‘prescribed connection’ to the care home.207  There is no provision for use of prior or 
equivalent assessments for the necessary and proportionate determination, implying it 
must be carried out afresh for each authorisation.  Unlike the capacity and medical 
assessments, which putatively impose no additional costs, the necessary and 
proportionate assessment has been costed by the government (at £145.28).208  The 
expectation is that the responsible body will build this determination into care planning, 
with additional resources provided for responsible bodies to undertake the 
determination for those with privately arranged care.209 
 
The DoLS required at least two assessors (BIA and MHAr), one of whom must be 
independent of the person’s care (the BIA), to conduct the relevant assessments. The 
Law Commission had proposed two assessors for the three core LPS assessments.210 
The 2019 amendments do not stipulate this; it is to be hoped that the new LPS Code 
will impose more demanding guidelines. 
 
(a) CONSULTATION 
 
The government asserted, somewhat misleadingly, that the LPS established a ‘new’ and 
stronger duty to consult with the cared-for person and their family211, in order to 
ascertain the ‘wishes or feelings’ of the person.212 The main difference is that the LPS 
consultation duty is explicit and contained within Schedule AA1, whereas the DoLS 
consultation duty was implicit, resting on the MCA’s best interests’ duty to consult 
others involved in the person’s care or interested in their welfare about the person’s 
wishes and feelings. Unlike the LPS, the best interests consultation duty also 
encompassed the person’s values and beliefs,213 and a more demanding duty to ‘permit 
and encourage’ the person to participate in decision making as ‘fully as possible’; these 
provisions are not replicated in the LPS. 214  The LPS duty initially (inadvertently) 
excluded the cared-for person themselves from the list of persons to be consulted,215 
but this was rectified during the passage of the Bill.216   
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The LPS consultation duty is vital for identifying potential objections, which trigger other 
key safeguards discussed below.  The duty falls on the responsible body or – under the 
care home arrangements – the care home manager.217  No ‘prescribed connection’ 
regulations apply to consultation, meaning this pivotal role may be undertaken by a 
person with a potential financial conflict of interest. There are risks that people may 
not feel comfortable expressing objections to those directly responsible for their care, 
or that potential signs of objection may missed, dismissed or explained away.  
Meanwhile the person making the necessary and proportionate determination is under 
no statutory duty to consult the person directly,218 and will therefore rely upon reports 
of their views by those carrying out the consultation. The capacity assessment offers a 
potential safeguard against distortion or misrepresentation of the person’s views here, 
provided it properly documents any potential objections, since it cannot be undertaken 
by the care home. 
 
(b) ‘NO REFUSALS’? 
 
The MCA enables a person with capacity to nominate their own preferred substitute 
decision maker in a Lasting Power of Attorney (LPA).219 The Court of Protection may 
also appoint a deputy to make specified decisions on the person’s behalf,220 and the 
person may themselves refuse specific medical treatments in advance.221  The DoLS 
‘no refusals’ requirement prohibited authorisations overriding a valid refusal of care and 
treatment by any attorney, deputy or the person themselves.222  In effect, therefore, 
the DoLS do not empower supervisory bodies to ‘trump’ care and treatment decisions 
made by the person themselves, those they have selected to make decisions for them, 
or decision makers appointed by the court. 
 
The Commission recommended a similar provision for the LPS,223 however it does not 
feature in the 2019 amendments. The government’s rationale was that ‘It is already 
the case that a best interest decision could not be taken which conflicted with a valid 
decision by an attorney/deputy.224 The Bill does not alter this.’225  Yet strictly speaking, 
there could be a valid objection to the arrangements authorised by the LPS but not the 
underlying care and treatment decisions.226  Had the LPS included a ‘risk of harm to 
others’ ground, this too could have circumvented objections insofar as it created scope 
for detention that is not justified on best interests grounds.  Objections by attorneys or 
deputies and advance refusals may be considered under the necessary and 
proportionate determination, but the LPS offer no cast iron guarantee that they will be 
determinative.   
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The Law Society observed that the LPS could also be used to trump the objections of 
parents of 16 and 17 year olds without a court order.227  This seems to be confirmed 
by the Law Commission when they observe that parents would have a right to bring 
proceedings in the Court of Protection if they objected.228 
 
There is therefore scope for highly complex litigation about the relative status of an 
LPS authorisation, the limits of parental authority, and other mechanisms for decision 
making under the MCA. 
 
  
     
227 See Law Society, n 92. 
228 Law Com 372 (n 71) at [7.37]. 
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V. INTERFACE WITH THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT 1983 
 
The interface between the DoLS and the MHA is notorious for its complexity.229 It is 
governed by a separate schedule230 and an ‘eligibility assessment’ undertaken by a BIA 
or MHAr with further specialist qualifications.231 In summary: 
 
1 DoLS can authorise detention outside of hospital provided this does not conflict with 
any requirements imposed under a community MHA regime, such as guardianship, 
supervised community treatment or conditional discharge by a tribunal. 
 
2 DoLS may authorise inpatient treatment for a physical disorder. 
 
3 If the detention is to secure inpatient treatment for mental disorder232 and the patient 
is ‘within scope’ of the MHA (that is, an application for detention could be made under 
s2 or s3 MHA) then patient is ineligible for the DoLS if they are objecting.233 
 
4 Patients within scope of the MHA who are not objecting may be detained under either 
the MHA or the DoLS.234 
 
5 Hospital inpatients may not fall ‘within scope’ of the MHA if they have recently been 
discharged by a tribunal235 or have learning disabilities236, in which case they may 
potentially be eligible for DoLS even if they are objecting. 
 
The complexity of the two interlocking regimes can make it difficult for patients 
themselves to understand and exercise their rights, especially if subject to both 
simultaneously. 237  The Law Commission heard reports of ‘stand offs’ between 
professionals arguing over which regime should be used.238 
 
The issues at stake in this interface include the stigma and paternalistic culture 
associated with the MHA239 (although it is unclear whether same might also be said of 
DoLS and LPS) and the more rigorous procedural safeguards under the MHA. These 
include more initial assessments, powers of discharge for relatives, automatic referrals 
to the tribunal, safeguards governing treatment without consent and non-means tested 
aftercare. Their criteria for detention also differ: the MHA permits detention of those 
considered to have ‘capacity’ and also permits detention on grounds of risk to others, 
unlike the DoLS (and LPS).  
     
229 E.g. Mental Capacity Act 2005: post-legislative scrutiny, n 36, at [271]. 
230 MCA Sched 1A. 
231 If undertaken by the MHAr, they must be an approved doctor under s12 MHA; if undertaken by the 
BIA, they must be qualified as an Approved Mental Health Professional. 
232 GJ v The Foundation Trust & Anor [2009] EWHC 2972 (Fam); [2010] M.H.L.R. 13. 
233 MCA Schedule 1A s2 ‘Case E’. 
234 AM v South London & Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust and The Secretary of State for Health [2013] 
UKUT 0365 (AAC); [2014] M.H.L.R. 181 
235 R. Jones and E. Piffaretti, Mental Capacity Act Manual (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018) 354, citing 
R. v East London and The City Mental Health Trust Ex P. Brandenburg [2004] 2 A.C. 280; [2003] UKHL 
58; [2004] M.H.L.R. 44. 
236 By way of MHA s1(2A). GJ v The Foundation Trust & Anor n 232  at [29]. 
237 E.g. C v Blackburn and Darwen Borough Council, n 36; KD v A Borough Council [2015] UKUT 0251 
(ACC); [2015] M.H.L.R. 358. NM v Kent County Council [2015] UKUT 125 (ACC); [2015] M.H.L.R. 343. 
238 Law Com 372, n 71, at [13.11]. 
239 Ibid, at [13.16]. 
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The Law Commission was troubled by the absence of a ‘clear or meaningful test’ for 
determining which scheme to use.240 One solution – favoured by the Commission and 
many consultees, but beyond its remit - was to ‘fuse’ the MCA and the MHA together, 
as Northern Ireland has. 241  Ultimately, the Commissioners were persuaded that 
retaining parallel legal regimes led to significant confusion and uncertainty in practice, 
and recommended that only the MHA should be available for detention on grounds of 
mental disorder (unless a patient had a learning disability).242 
 
Following a 2017 election campaign pledge by Theresa May to address rising rates of 
detention under the MHA,243 an independent review of the Act had been established. 
Its recommendation was at odds with the Law Commission’s: the DoLS/LPS should be 
retained for mental health detention, but discretion to use either regime should be 
eliminated by specifying that only the DoLS/LPS could be used in non-objecting 
cases.244 This would assist with the policy goal of reducing MHA detentions, but the 
same patients, subject to the same treatment and regimes, could instead be detained 
under the MCA, only with weaker procedural safeguards.  
 
The interface rules between the DoLS and MHA are therefore more or less reproduced 
in the LPS at present,245 but may be revisited in the future.  Responsible bodies (and 
care home managers) will therefore still be tasked with navigating this complex 
interface in ensuring the proposed arrangements are not excluded ‘mental health 
arrangements’ before they can be authorised.246  All that has changed is that this is no 
longer framed as a distinct ‘assessment’, and there are no statutory requirements for 
the qualifications or experience of those navigating this legal labyrinth. 
 
(a) PRE-AUTHORISATION REVIEW 
 
The LPS aim to address the volume problem following Cheshire West by building the 
core assessments into existing care planning processes. It is hoped this ‘streamlining’ 
will lead to earlier and better consideration of the MCA and principles of necessity and 
proportionality during care and treatment decision making, before decisions are 
implemented. 247  The cost of this streamlined approach, however, is reduced 
independent scrutiny by assessors who are not involved in care and treatment 
decisions.  This independent safeguard against ‘misjudgments and professional lapses’ 
     
240 Law Com CP 222, n 53, at [10.20]. 
241 Mental Capacity Act (Northern Ireland) 2016 SI 2016/18. 
242 Law Com 372, n71, recommendation 37. 
243 M. Savage, ‘Theresa May pledges mental health revolution will reduce detentions’ (The Guardian 7 
May 2017) at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/07/theresa-may-pledges-mental-
health-revolution-will-reduce-detentions. 
244 ‘Modernising the Mental Health Act’, n 17, Recommendation 41. 
245 MCA Sched AA1 Part 7, ‘Excluded Arrangements: Mental Health’. Note that an LPS authorisation can 
now sit alongside a MHA detention, to cater for the simultaneous delivery of physical healthcare under 
mental health detention, a gap identified in A NHS Trust v Dr. A [2013] EWHC 2442 (COP); [2014] 2 
W.L.R. 607. 
246 MCA Sched AA1 s2(c) states that ‘This Schedule’ does not apply to arrangements excluded by Part 7 
(‘Excluded arrangements: Mental Health’).  When authorising the arrangements the responsible body 
(s18(a)) or the care home manager (s19(b)(i)) must be satisfied that the schedule ‘applies to the 
arrangements’. 
247 Law Com No 372, n71, at [5.31]. 
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was a driving motivation behind both HL v UK 248 and Cheshire West.249  Where the 
same professionals are involved in planning care and treatment and in authorising 
detention, the ECHR requires ‘guarantees of independence’ and counterbalancing 
procedures.250 
 
Under the LPS this independent element is provided through a pre-authorisation review 
by the responsible body.251 This must be carried out by somebody who is not involved 
in the ‘day-to-day care’ of the person or providing any treatment to them, and without 
any ‘prescribed connection’ to the care home.252 There is no statutory provision for 
regulations stipulating qualifications or experiences, but some guidance may be 
provided in the Code.  The reviewer is personally 253  responsible for determining 
‘whether it is reasonable for the responsible body to conclude that the authorisation 
conditions are met’ based on ‘the information on which the responsible body relies’.254 
The Law Commission anticipated that reviewers would not make additional enquiries 
or commission fresh assessments,255 but there is no statutory bar to them doing so. It 
is debatable how effective a safeguard this desktop review will prove to be where the 
information itself is of dubious quality or inaccurate. Some reviewers may adopt a 
muscular approach, refusing to authorise on the basis of visibly poor-quality 
assessments. Much will depend on the skills and experience of the reviewer, and the 
culture and resources of the institution.  
 
(b) APPROVED MENTAL CAPACITY PROFESSIONALS 
 
The Law Commission recognised that the role of BIAs was particularly important under 
the DoLS. They proposed a revised role as Approved Mental Capacity Professionals 
(AMCPs), central to the authorisation of arrangements amounting to deprivation of 
liberty. Following Cheshire West there are simply not enough BIAs to undertake 
assessments for all DoLS applications (one cause of supervisory body backlogs),256 and 
the Commission felt it was not ‘proportionate or affordable’ for AMCPs to be involved 
in every case under the LPS.257  They identified cases where the arrangements were 
‘contrary to the person’s wishes’ as most in need of oversight.258 Accordingly, wherever 
‘there is reason to believe’ the cared-for person does not wish to reside in a particular 
place, or to receive care or treatment there, the case must be referred by independent 
reviewers to AMCPs.259   
 
The Commission also recognised that other situations could require oversight, giving 
as examples cases where the person’s wishes were unclear, the restrictions were 
‘particularly intensive or intrusive’ or where those close to the person were objecting.260 
     
248 HL v UK, n 27, at [121]. 
249 Cheshire West, n58, at [1], [9], [32] and [57]. 
250 IN v Ukraine (App 28472/08); [2019] M.H.L.R. 124; BAILII [2016] ECHR 565, at [81]. 
251 MCA Sched AA1 s24. 
252 MCA Sched AA1 s21(1). 
253 Law Com No 372 (n 71) at [10.25]. 
254 MCA Sched AA1 s26. 
255 Law Com No 372 (n 71) at [10.25]. 
256 Local Government Ombudsman, ‘Investigation into a complaint against Staffordshire County Council’ 
(reference number: 18 004 809) (2019). 
257 Law Com No 372 (n71) at [10.32]. 
258 Ibid, at [10.35]. 
259 MCA Sched AA1 s24(2)(a)-(b). 
260 Law Com No 372 (n 71) [10.43], Draft Bill Sched AA1 s23(3)(a). 
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Initially the government did not include the Commission’s proposed discretionary power 
to refer cases to an AMCP in such scenarios, but following objections by stakeholders261 
it was reinserted.262 Because of concerns about conflicts of interest for independent 
hospitals, these cases must also be referred to an AMCP.263  The government estimates 
that  25 per cent of all LPS applications will require review by an AMCP.264 
 
AMCPs must ‘review the information on which the responsible body relies’ and 
‘determine whether the authorisation conditions are met’. 265   Before making this 
determination the AMCP must – if it appears to them to be ‘appropriate and practicable 
to do so’ – meet with the cared-for person and consult those listed under the 
consultation duty.266 The government’s anticipates only a ‘small number’ of cases where 
it is not appropriate for the AMCP to meet with the cared-for person.267  
 
AMCPs have more flexible powers than BIAs. They have an open-ended power to ‘take 
any other action’ that appears to the AMCP to be appropriate and practicable.268 This 
could potentially include undertaking assessments themselves, taking steps to resolve 
disputes, or exploring less restrictive alternatives. The 2019 amendments do not include 
the Law Commission’s recommendation that if AMCPs refuse to authorise arrangements 
they should give written reasons explaining why and describing necessary steps to 
obtain approval,269 but nothing prevents AMCPs from doing so. Whereas BIAs could 
only recommend that authorisation be subject to conditions,270 AMCPs potentially have 
greater control over the arrangements since the responsible body may only authorise 
them if the AMCP agrees the LPS conditions are met.271  
 
Despite the potential strengths of AMCPs, weaknesses remain. Roger Hargreaves, a 
retired social worker and DoLS policy lead, notes that the statutory restriction on ‘day 
to day’ involvement in care does not preclude some degree of involvement in underlying 
decisions272, although the Code may go further.  The biggest concern is whether 
referrals to AMCPs will be made where a person’s wishes and feelings are unclear, 
contested, or potential objections are suppressed by medication, institutionalisation or 
fear of rocking the boat.  Those detained for treatment for mental disorder in NHS 
hospitals are especially unlikely to be referred to an AMCP, because if they are regarded 
as objecting then they would generally be ineligible for the LPS. 
  
     
261 See for example the evidence to the Public Bill Committee of the National DoLS Leads, available at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmpublic/MentalCapacity/memo/MCAB02.pdf. 
262 MCA Sched AA1 s24(2)(d). 
263 MCA Sched AA1 s24(2)(c). This was inserted on Report following debates in the Public Bill Committee 
in the House of Commons. 
264 Law Commission, ‘Impact Assessment: Mental Capacity and Detention’ (LAWCOM0055, 2017) 33. 
265 MCA Sched AA1 s25(1). 
266 MCA Sch AA1 s25(2). 
267 ‘Final Government Response to the Law Commission's review of Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards 
and Mental Capacity’, n87. Response to recommendation 20. 
268 MCA Sched AA1 s25(2)(b). 
269 Law Com No 372 (n71) at [10.51]. 
270 MCA Sched A1 s 52(2). 
271 MCA Sched AA1 s18(f) (for authorisation via responsible bodies), s19(e) (where authorised via the 
care home  arrangements).   
272  Written evidence of Roger Hargreaves (MCAB04) to the Public Bill Committee, available at: 
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(c) THE DURATION OF AUTHORISATIONS 
 
Article 5(1) requires reviews at ‘reasonable intervals’ to ensure the criteria for detention 
continue to be met.273  The supervisory body may specify a maximum duration of 12 
months for a DoLS authorisation. Once expired, fresh authorisation must be sought, 
with the full complement of assessments and procedures. Consultees told the Law 
Commission this incurred ‘significant costs’ yet amounted to a ‘rubber stamping 
exercise’ when a person’s condition was stable.274  The LPS introduce the option to 
‘renew’ or vary an authorisation, indefinitely, without necessarily undertaking the full 
battery of assessments and determinations.  
 
(d) RENEWALS, VARIATIONS AND REVIEWS  
 
An initial LPS authorisation may last up to twelve months,275 then be renewed for a 
further twelve months and thereafter for periods of up to three years.276 Responsible 
bodies may renew the authorisation if they are satisfied that ‘the authorisation 
conditions continue to be met’, ‘that it is unlikely that there will be any significant 
change in the cared-for person’s condition during the renewal period which would affect 
whether those conditions are met’, and they have carried out a fresh consultation under 
the consultation duty.277 Provided the responsible body is satisfied of the foregoing, 
they may also choose to renew on the basis of a written statement from the care home 
manager, where the care home carries out the consultation.278 
 
The LPS also allow authorisations to be ‘varied’, provided the responsible body is 
satisfied both that a fresh consultation has been carried out by the responsible body or 
care home manager, and ‘that it is reasonable to make the variation’.279  
 
An authorisation ceases to have effect if the responsible body ‘believes or ought 
reasonably to suspect that any of the authorisation conditions are not met’. 280  
Responsible bodies must specify a program of reviews of the authorisation,281 and must 
additionally review an authorisation if it is varied, ‘if a reasonable request is made by a 
person with an interest in the arrangements’, if the cared-for person becomes subject 
to a regime of the MHA or receives inpatient treatment for mental disorder, or where 
the reviewer becomes aware of objections by the cared-for person but the original pre-
authorisation review was not by an AMCP.282 The review may be carried out by the 
responsible body, or by the care home manager.283  
 
There is no statutory requirement for fresh medical or capacity assessments, or 
‘necessary and proportionate’ determinations for renewals, variations or reviews.  This 
is potentially a matter of serious concern given that authorisation may be renewed 
     
273 Winterwerp, n 115, at [55]. 
274 ‘Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty - Consultation Analysis’, n186, [11.30]. 
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indefinitely and variations to an authorisation may potentially involve significant 
changes. The Law Commission284 and the government285 anticipated that most reviews 
would require a fresh necessary and proportionate determination, and this may be 
recommended in the Code. Guidance will be needed on the point beyond which it is 
not ‘reasonable’ to deal with changes without a fresh authorisation, with the full battery 
of assessments and determinations. 
 
The LPS renewal process is roughly analogous to the approach taken under the MHA. 
However, the timescales for renewals under the MHA are much shorter (initially after 
six months and thereafter every 12 months), and MHA renewals require a report by the 
responsible clinician to the hospital managers.286 Under the LPS, statutory requirements 
for independence (of reviewers) and regulations concerning qualifications or experience 
do not apply to renewals or reviews unless AMCPs carry them out.  In the MHA context, 
further protection is offered by other available safeguards, not least automatic periodic 
reviews by a tribunal; equivalent safeguards are far weaker under the LPS. The 
‘adjusted’ LPS therefore provide for indefinite detention with very limited independent 
oversight. 
 
(e) INTERIM AUTHORISATIONS AND EMERGENCIES  
 
The MCA only protects against liability for deprivation of liberty where a standard or 
urgent287 DoLS authorisation is in place, or where court authorisation is being sought 
or has been granted.288  This creates potential gaps in protection against liability for 
care and treatment providers.  Providers waiting longer than two weeks for a standard 
authorisation (as most currently will) are in theory exposed to liability, and the MCA 
does not provide for deprivation of liberty in emergency situations where it is not 
feasible to make a DoLS or court application.289 
 
The LPS offer interim protection against liability whilst the responsible body is carrying 
out functions under the LPS ‘with a view to determining’ whether to authorise the 
arrangements, or a care home has taken ‘reasonable steps’ to notify the responsible 
body of any such arrangements.290  There is also emergency protection against liability 
for those undertaking ‘vital acts’ to prevent ‘a serious deterioration in P’s condition’, 
provided there is a reasonable belief that the person lacks capacity and it would not be 
‘reasonably practicable’ to make an application for the person to be detained under the 
LPS or Part 2 of the MHA.291 
 
The Law Commission recommended against imposing a time limit on interim 
authorisations lest responsible bodies aimed for a maximum time. 292  Opposition 
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285  ‘Impact Assessment: Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill’ (2018), n 117, at [12.19]; ‘Impact 
Assessment: Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill’ (2019), n 4, [12.31] –[12.32]. 
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amendments to limit emergency provisions to 14 days were rejected by the government 
on the same grounds,293 but guidance will be provided in the Code.294 Of particular 
concern is the absence of any clear commitment to legal aid for challenges pending 
authorisation.295 
 
(f) RIGHTS OF CHALLENGE 
 
Article 5(4) rights to a court review of detention are a fundamental safeguard against 
arbitrary detention. Rights of challenge are especially important under article 5 when – 
as under DoLS, LPS and the MHA –detention is initiated without involving the courts.296  
Under article 5(4) everyone who is deprived of their liberty is entitled ‘to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a 
court’.  This must be ‘accessible to the person’, and ‘practical and effective’.297 ‘Special 
procedural safeguards’ may be needed to ‘protect the interests’ of those who are ‘not 
fully capable of acting for themselves’.298 
 
States have a margin of appreciation over how this is realised.299 The mechanism 
employed by the MHA is an automatic periodic referral to a tribunal,300 to counteract 
for what Gostin called ‘the burden of coming forward’ in initiating an appeal.301  The 
Law Commission considered this 302  but it would have had tremendous resource 
implications because of the scale of detention under LPS.303 
 
Alternatively, states might ‘empower or even require’ someone to act on the person’s 
behalf.304 Both DoLS and the LPS adopt this approach through complex provisions for 
representation and advocacy. However, this approach raises the risk that 
representatives may decline to act on the person’s behalf if they view the detention as 
in the person’s best interests or regard a challenge as futile. The ECtHR has held that 
rights of appeal must not depend on the goodwill or discretion of third parties305; there 
must be a clear duty to assist.306  
 
     
293 Hansard, HC Public Bill Committee (6th Sitting) col 173-78, n 100  and see Division 22. 
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A refusal to assist in bringing an appeal cannot be justified by prospects of success307  
In AJ v A Local Authority 308 the Court of Protection held that ‘there is no place in Article 
5(4) for a best interests decision about the exercise of that right since that would 
potentially prevent the involvement of the court’.309  If a detained person is unable to 
enlist assistance to appeal, then article 5(4) may be violated.310  This approach mirrors 
the Neary dictum that a person is ‘not only entitled but must be enabled’  to appeal.311  
 
(g) REPRESENTATION AND ADVOCACY 
 
Under both the DoLS and the LPS the primary responsibility for ‘enabling’ rights of 
challenge fall on informal representatives – RPRs under the DoLS and ‘appropriate 
persons’ under the LPS. These will generally be friends or relatives of the person. 
Difficulties arise if they are unwilling, unable or unclear about obligations to enable 
rights of challenge. Friends and relatives may also find the court appeal process 
daunting or bewildering – an octogenarian RPR described it as ‘complex and 
harrowing’.312 Others, like Steven Neary’s father, may be scared of rocking the boat 
when reliant on the responsible body to provide care or treatment. In AJ the Court of 
Protection held that RPRs must be both willing and able to assist the person in 
exercising rights of challenge.313 Close relatives or friends who supported or helped set 
up the arrangements may therefore be inappropriate because of their clear conflict of 
interest in challenging them.314 This is likely to be a particular concern for privately 
arranged care for many older people. Responsible bodies are obliged to monitor the 
RPR and terminate their appointment if they fail to fulfil this representation role.315  
 
The provisions for representation and advocacy under both the DoLS and LPS are 
extremely complex, and are depicted in Error! Reference source not found. (for 
DoLS) and Error! Reference source not found. (for LPS).  There are some important 
differences between the two schemes. The DoLS require that a person is represented 
by an RPR or an IMCA, or both, in all circumstances. The same cannot be said for the 
LPS: as Error! Reference source not found. shows, there are various circumstances 
where a detained person may have nobody representing them. The DoLS also 
guarantees to the detained person a freestanding unconditional right to request an 
IMCA, however under the LPS if the responsible body is satisfied there is an ‘appropriate 
person’ to represent the cared-for person, their right to request an IMCA in effect 
transfers to the appropriate person.  Under the DoLS, the provisions for appointing an 
IMCA are based on situations where otherwise the person would be unrepresented316, 
or where an (unpaid) RPR and the detained person are likely to, or already have, failed 
to exercise rights of challenge when it would be ‘reasonable’ to do so.317  This means 
that under the DoLS if there is an indication that the person might wish to exercise 
rights of appeal and the RPR is not assisting them, the supervisory body must appoint 
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an IMCA to assist them.  However, under the LPS, duties to appoint an IMCA are based 
on capacity and best interests determinations,318 creating a clear risk of concluding that 
it is not in a person’s ‘best interests’ to be provided with advocacy support to exercise 
rights of challenge.  
 
Under the DoLS, supervisory bodies ‘must appoint’ an IMCA where the relevant duties 
are engaged,319 but under the LPS responsible bodies must only take ‘reasonable steps’ 
to do so.  There are therefore numerous situations under the LPS where best interests 
decisions, a failure to appoint an IMCA, or a failure to ensure representatives are both 
willing and able to challenge the detention potentially stand between a person being 
entitled to appeal and their being enabled to do so.   
 
The risk that a person will be unable to exercise rights of challenge under article 5(4) 
is, if anything, further increased under the LPS in comparison with the existing problems 
under the DoLS.
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Figure 2 Schematic depiction of provision for advocacy and representation under the DoLS 
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Figure 3 Schematic depiction of provisions for advocacy and representation under the LPS 
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Given the sheer complexity and gaps in both schemes it may be preferable to place the 
primary duty to enable rights of challenge on responsible bodies, instead of their 
serving as a ‘fallback’ where representatives have failed to do so. However, this was 
not considered by the Law Commission, and although a provision to this effect was 
inserted into the Bill in the Lords320 it was removed by a later government amendment.  
The government’s approach was that detained persons and their relatives were of 
course ‘entitled’ to appeal but that recourse to courts should be avoided. 321  The 
question of whether a detained person would be enabled to appeal when they wished 
to do so was not addressed.  The Law Commission had envisioned an automatic opt-
out advocacy scheme, meaning the majority of people would receive expert assistance 
and advice on rights of challenge.322 However, the government was concerned about 
the ‘imposition’ of advocacy and felt ‘support from family and friends may be more 
appropriate and beneficial’.323 Thus the 2019 amendments reverted to more limited 
scheme of independent advocacy, prioritising the putative preferences of families over 
enabling rights of challenge.   
 
(h) RIGHTS TO INFORMATION  
 
Rights of challenge can only operate effectively if people are informed of their rights.324  
Thus Article 5(2) contains a duty to inform a person promptly and ‘in a language which 
he understands’ of the reasons why they have been deprived of their liberty. 325 
Detaining authorities must take ‘reasonable steps’ to impart this information326 – and 
where the person would not be able to understand it should be communicated to others 
able to represent their interests.327   
 
The DoLS require the managing authority of the care home or hospital to inform the 
detained person about the authorisation and their rights,328 whilst the supervisory body 
must give copies of the authorisation documentation to those representing the detained 
person, and ‘every interested person consulted by the best interests assessor.’329  The 
Law Commission did not discuss rights to information in their consultation and they did 
not appear initially in the 2018 Bill. This was raised as a concern by stakeholders and 
peers in the Lords. Bizarrely, the Minister at one point suggested that people could 
make subject access requests for this information under the GDPR, 330  implying a 
fundamental lack of understanding of the nature of this safeguard.  
 
     
320 This formed part of the ‘rights to information’ amendment inserted into the Lords. The relevant clause 
(s13(5) of the Bill as brought forward from the Lords) read ‘The responsible body must ensure that cases 
are referred to court when the cared-for person’s right to a court review is engaged.’ 
321 Hansard, HL Series 5 col 371, n 196. 
322 Law Com No 372 (n71) [12.40]. 
323 ‘Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty - Consultation Analysis’, n186, [8.7]. 
324 Van Der Leer v The Netherlands [1990] 12 E.H.R.R. 567, at [27]; X v United Kingdom (1982) 4 
E.H.R.R. 188; LM v Slovenia (App 32863/05); [2019] M.H.L.R. 67; BAILII [2014] ECHR 608, at [1452]. 
325 Ibid. 
326 ZH v Hungary (App 28973/11); [2014] M.H.L.R. 1; BAILII [2012] ECHR 1891, at [41]. 
327 Ibid; LM v Slovenia n 324; X v UK (App no 6998/75) [1980] ECHR Report of the Commission (Adopted 
on 16 July 1980), see also related proceedings before ECtHR (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 188 
328 MCA Sched A1 s 59. 
329 MCA Sched A1 s57. 
330 Hansard, HL Series 5 col 337 no 196 (The Lord O’Shaughnessy). 
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The Lords inserted an amendment containing rights to information into the Bill331, which 
was accepted in principle but redrafted by the government in the Commons. The LPS 
now contain a three-stage information duty. Responsible bodies must publish general 
information about the authorisation process and people’s rights under the LPS scheme, 
in formats that are ‘accessible to, and appropriate to the needs of, cared-for persons 
and appropriate persons’.332 Once arrangements ‘are proposed’, the responsible body 
‘must as soon as practicable take such steps as are practicable to ensure that’ the 
cared-for person and any appropriate person understands the nature of the 
arrangements, the effect of authorisation, and core rights including reviews and 
challenge.333  After authorisation, copies of the authorisation record must be given to 
the cared-for person and any IMCA or appropriate person representing them.334 
 
In some respects, the LPS adopt a more sophisticated approach to rights to information 
than the DoLS, with potential for higher quality accessible general information than 
exists presently. However, unlike the DoLS, a person who is consulted during the LPS 
process is not entitled to a copy of the authorisation record unless they are the 
‘appropriate person’.  This means friends and family may struggle to access the 
authorisation record if not considered ‘appropriate’ to represent the person. 
 
(i) COURT, OR TRIBUNAL  
 
Under the DoLS, an ‘appeal’ against detention is made through an application to the 
Court of Protection to review a DoLS authorisation under s21A MCA.  As outlined above, 
there are significant concerns that this process is not being initiated when it should be 
– with the appeal rate currently standing at around 1 per cent. The government 
anticipates the rate of appeal will fall to 0.5 per cent of authorisations under the LPS, 
on the questionable basis that AMCPs will act as mediators in disputes.335  
 
This fractional difference in estimated rates of appeal may seem trifling, but holds the 
key to understanding the fundamental weakness in the scheme: the cost of challenges 
in the Court of Protection. In 2015 the median cost to a supervisory body of a s21A 
appeal was around £10,000, but could exceed £100,000 in complex cases, whilst the 
median cost of a legal aid certificate for either P or the RPR was £7,288 and the mean 
was £14,665.336 The sheer scale of the LPS, coupled with the very high cost of appeals, 
meant that depressing the estimated rate of appeal a mere 0.5 per cent shaved over 
£35m off the estimated cost of the entire scheme,337 a substantial proportion of the 
claimed £200m savings.  Increasing rates of appeal beyond the already concerningly 
low rates under the DoLS would have wiped out any savings for the entire LPS scheme. 
 
     
331 This is contained in Sched AA1 s13 in the version of the Bill dated 12 December 2018 (Bill 303). 
332 MCA Sched AA1 s14. 
333 MCA Sched AA1 s15. 
334 MCA Sched AA1 s16. 
335 ‘Impact Assessment: Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill’ (2018) (n 117), at [12.32]. 
336 L Series, P Fennell and J Doughty, n25. 
337 The estimated costs for 0.5 per cent of LPS authorisations resulting in an appeal was £12.77m in legal 
aid costs, costs of £18.25 to responsible bodies and costs of £4.56m to the Official Solicitor. ‘Impact 
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The complex reasons for the high costs of Court of Protection litigation are beyond the 
scope of this paper, but appear to have exerted a chilling effect on improving rights of 
challenge under the LPS.  The solution, of course, is to reform the Court of Protection 
itself – addressing other associated concerns including delay, accessibility and 
participation in the proceedings.338  Throughout the history of the MCA and the DoLS, 
the idea of a tribunal to adjudicate disputes has been debated, and well supported at 
consultation by those favouring an informal, accessible and efficient form of dispute 
resolution.339  
 
The Law Commission initially favoured a tribunal under the LPS,340 as did the majority 
of consultees, but this was opposed by Court of Protection stakeholders.341 However, 
in their final report the Commission noted difficulties separating out LPS appeals from 
wider health and welfare matters which remained within the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Protection.  This concern tacitly acknowledges the difficulties outlined above in 
separating out the ‘arrangements’ authorised under the LPS from the underlying care 
and treatment decisions made under the MCA. Devolution of the mental health tribunals 
in Wales also presented difficulties.  The Commission called for a further review of the 
appropriate judicial body for LPS appeals. 342  The JCHR also recommended the 
government consider a tribunal or reform of the Court of Protection.343 However, the 
promised review is still awaited344 and so the forum for appeal under the LPS remains 
the unreformed Court of Protection under a new provision – s21ZA.   
 
(j) REVIEWING THE ‘ARRANGEMENTS’ 
 
The troubled distinction between underlying care and treatment decisions made under 
the MCA, and the ‘arrangements’ to enable these, surfaces again in relation to court 
reviews. Challenges to decisions made under the main provisions of the MCA are 
rare,345 in part because of restrictions on financial eligibility for legal aid. Following 
Cheshire West a number of challenges were brought under s21A. Many related to 
ancillary matters such as a person’s capacity to make decisions around sex or 
contact,346 and even serious medical treatment decisions such as the withdrawal of 
artificial nutrition and hydration from people with severe brain injuries. 347  In Director 
of Legal Aid Casework & Ors v Briggs348 the Court of Appeal ruled that this was an 
     
338 L Series, P Fennell and J Doughty, n25. 
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340 Law Com CP 222, n 53, Provisional proposals 11-1 – 11-4. 
341 ‘Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty - Consultation Analysis’, n186, Chapter 10. 
342 Law Com No 372 (n71) Recommendation34. 
343 Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Right to Freedom and Safety, n65, at [64-5] 
344 Department of Health and Social Care, ‘The Government's Response to The Joint Committee on 
Human Rights 7th and 12th Reports (2019)’, at [1.17], at: https://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-
committees/human-rights/Govt-response-7-12-JCHR.pdf. 
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P in Welfare Cases in the Court of Protection’ (Report for the Nuffield Foundation, Cardiff University, 
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illegitimate use of legal aid for s21A challenges, but held that matters like ‘contact’ still 
fell within the ambit of DoLS appeals. It seems quite possible the Legal Aid Agency may 
make further attempts to restrict the nature of challenges that can be brought under 
s21ZA, relying upon the ‘bright line’ distinction between care and treatment decisions 
and the arrangements emphasised in connection with the LPS. 
 
(k) THE DEFINITION OF DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY  
 
Although it was hoped that Cheshire West would definitively answer the question ‘what 
is a deprivation of liberty?’, there continued to be pressure for a statutory definition. 
Some respondents to the Law Commission’s consultation hoped to reverse Cheshire 
West.349 The Law Commission, whilst sympathetic, concluded this was ‘misguided’ since 
it could create gaps between the LPS scheme and the interpretation of article 5 by the 
courts under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).350 
 
The JCHR was also troubled by the consequences of Cheshire West, and particularly 
concerned by the application of the ‘acid test’ in domestic settings.  Echoing its earlier 
call for a statutory definition the JCHR considered two possibilities.351 They concluded 
that a ‘causative’ approach based R (Ferreira) v HM Senior Coroner for Inner South 
London,352 which holds that if the person’s ‘underlying condition was the cause’ of their 
not being free to leave this does not engage article 5, could give rise to difficulties in 
interpretation and be viewed as discriminatory.353  The second approach, which found 
more favour, tackled an element of deprivation of liberty not considered by the 
Supreme Court in Cheshire West: whether a person has given a ‘valid consent’ to their 
confinement.354 Basing its recommendation on a submission from Alex Ruck Keene355 
(who worked at the Law Commission on the LPS proposals) the Committee proposed a 
broader approach to ‘valid consent’ than the MCA’s binary test of mental capacity.356 
This, they suggested, was supported by the CRPD Committee’s rejection of the binaries 
of ‘mental incapacity’.357   
 
A draft amendment specified that for the purposes of determining whether a person is 
deprived of their liberty under the LPS, the cared-for person should be considered to 
have given a ‘valid consent’ if they are ‘capable of expressing their wishes and feelings 
(verbally or otherwise)’, they had expressed ‘their persistent contentment’ with the 
     
349 Law Com No 372, n71, [5.36-7]   
350 Ibid, [5.37]. 
351 JCHR, The Right to Freedom and Safety: Reform of the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards, n65, 
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arrangements, there was ‘no coercion involved’ in their implementation, and this was 
confirmed in writing by two professionals (one independent of the person’s care).358 
This CRPD-influenced proposal could have resolved some of the more jarring outcomes 
of Cheshire West, such as the conclusion that Steven Neary is deprived of his liberty in 
his own home, where he actively wishes to live, whilst still providing procedural 
safeguards.359  It was tabled by Lord Woolf,360 but rejected by the government on the 
basis that it conflicted with the position under the ECHR and would create a ‘gap’ in 
protection under the LPS scheme.361 
 
Initially the Government accepted the Law Commission’s recommendation against a 
statutory definition of deprivation of liberty. 362  However, under pressure from 
stakeholders and the JCHR the government published its own statutory definition of 
deprivation of liberty only days before the Public Bill Committee in the House of 
Commons.363 That definition was resoundingly criticised by stakeholders.364 It would 
have excluded arrangements where a person’s ability to come and go from the place 
of their confinement was only temporary and potentially subject to permission seeking 
requirements, in direct contradiction of ECHR case law.365 It created latitude to escape 
scrutiny under the LPS by asserting that ‘if the person expressed a wish to leave the 
person would be enabled to do so’ – an approach that was rejected by the courts in 
both Bournewood and Cheshire West.366  The government’s statutory definition was 
rejected in the Lords and replaced with an alternative definition, 367  which was 
subsequently rejected by the House of Commons.  
 
The final position agreed by both houses is that the 2019 amendments do not define 
deprivation of liberty, however guidance on those arrangements falling within scope of 
the LPS must be given in the Code of Practice, which must be reviewed within three 
years of coming into force and every five years thereafter.368 This approach, whilst no 
doubt unsatisfactory to those hoping to reverse Cheshire West, at least has the merit 
of not creating a constitutional nightmare for any court faced with conflicting 
interpretations of deprivation of liberty from the ECtHR, the Supreme Court and 
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Parliament. The Code has more space for detail and nuance, and can be revised as 
case law develops. Nor does this approach preclude a legal challenge on what 
constitutes a ‘valid consent’ under the LPS, in the manner advocated for by the JCHR. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The Government’s aim in the 2019 amendments to the MCA was to ‘reform a broken 
and bureaucratic DoLS system’, 369  provide ‘proportionate’ safeguards, increase 
flexibility, reduce complexity, and save £200m.  The final Act is a different beast from 
the heavily criticised Bill introduced in July 2018, but it also differs from the Law 
Commission’s proposals, which rested on improvements to the operation of the MCA, 
and much wider access to independent advocacy.  Have the 2019 amendments 
achieved the government’s aims, or should we agree with Baroness Murphy’s 
assessment that Parliament has failed in its task?370 
 
For those hoping to reverse Cheshire West, or concerned that the LPS will now pursue 
people ‘in their own homes’371, the 2019 amendments will disappoint. The LPS will 
provide safeguards that are currently entirely absent for people in settings such as 
supported living, and potentially improve access to justice through expanding the 
number of people eligible for legal aid via s21ZA challenges. Yet people in care homes 
and hospitals will lose layers of protection that the DoLS deliver in theory (although 
often not in reality).  The scheme is highly vulnerable to human rights challenges, 
particularly around its provisions for representation, renewals and appeals, unless 
creatively patched up by the Code and the courts, as the DoLS themselves were. 
 
The LPS attempt to secure article 5 compliance on an unprecedented scale by giving 
responsible bodies considerable discretion in how they deliver the safeguards. This 
flexibility introduces both complexity and risk.  Some responsible bodies will no doubt 
use the LPS as they have the DoLS – to scrutinise and address restrictive practices and 
resolve disputes.  Others will be less vigilant, and the next generation of Neary type 
litigation will consider how responsible bodies exercise their considerable discretion 
over assessments, determinations, renewals, reviews and fundamental safeguards 
including representation, advocacy and appeals.  The risk remains that some people 
who are deprived of their liberty will not receive any safeguards at all. Even following 
Cheshire West there is considerable variability in the age standardised rates of DoLS 
applications across supervisory bodies, raising the possibility that some supervisory 
bodies are more proactive than others in securing article 5 safeguards.372 
 
The LPS foreground the wishes and feelings of the person in a way that the DoLS often 
failed to do. ‘Objections’ is the weight bearing concept for the crucial safeguard of 
AMCP review. Courts and practitioners will have to grapple with the complexities of 
working out what a person wants, and what it means to ‘object’, when one’s methods 
of communication are (at least to others) unclear or disputed, or even suppressed by 
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one’s circumstances. This is not the ‘will and preferences’ paradigm exhorted in 
connection with the CRPD, but it is a step in that direction. 
 
At the heart of the DoLS and the LPS lurks an anxiety, about the kinds of power that 
are exercised within caregiving relationships, particularly where the care recipient is 
unlikely to be able to alert others to problems.  It is doubtful that article 5 is the best 
mechanism for addressing this in some of the circumstances where the LPS will now 
apply.373 But there were few other available vehicles for securing independent scrutiny 
and challenge under the MCA, and no sign of a government seeking to remedy this. 
Bournewood and Cheshire West held a gun to the government’s head,374 and the LPS 
was the reply. 
 
We are left with our unanswered question: what are these safeguards for?  Are they, 
as Baroness Murphy suggests, addressing ‘a problem we did not know we had’, 
instigated by the judiciary375?  The circular answer of article 5 compliance does not help 
us. We might ask what article 5 is protecting Steven Neary from today, living happily 
in his own home? Telling thousands of families that they are detaining their relatives 
feels like political dynamite at a time when human rights are increasingly vulnerable.376 
Yet there are very real concerns about coercion and restrictive practices in a broad 
range of care settings, with limited alternative scrutiny, and few realistic avenues for 
disabled people and families to challenge decisions made under the MCA.  Whether the 
LPS will assist in addressing the substantive issues, or merely draw a veil of legitimacy 
over the ‘arrangements’, remains to be seen. 
 
POSTSCRIPT 
 
This article was written in 2019, when we inhabited another world, before the 
coronavirus pandemic of 2020 and the UK lockdown.  Although the UK government has 
introduced ‘easements’ to the MHA in response to the coronavirus Act, it has not done 
so for the MCA or the DoLS. Expectations that people in care homes will be ‘isolated’ in 
their rooms, and the imposition of ‘lockdown’ measures raise specific issues for the MCA 
and the DoLS that have not as yet been addressed.377 The likelihood is that many more 
people are now effectively deprived of their liberty in care homes and other care 
settings – often unlawfully – in response to the pandemic.  It is also likely that work on 
the new Codes of Practice and regulations, and implementation of the LPS, will be 
significantly delayed by this crisis. 
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